Reported in New York Official Reports at Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51606(U))
| Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51606(U) [53 Misc 3d 146(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-2347 Q C
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered September 17, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. By order entered September 17, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.
For the reasons stated in Omphil Care, Inc., as Assignee of Paul Fabiola v Allstate Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op ____ [appeal No. 2013-2290 Q C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016
Reported in New York Official Reports at Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51605(U))
| Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51605(U) [53 Misc 3d 146(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-2346 Q C
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered September 16, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. By order entered September 16, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.
For the reasons stated in Omphil Care, Inc., as Assignee of Paul Fabiola v Allstate Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op ___ [appeal No. 2013-2290 Q C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016
Reported in New York Official Reports at Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51604(U))
| Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51604(U) [53 Misc 3d 146(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-2345 Q C
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered September 16, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. By order entered September 16, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.
For the reasons stated in Omphil Care, Inc., as Assignee of Paul Fabiola v Allstate Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2013-2290 Q C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016
Reported in New York Official Reports at Omphil Care, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51603(U))
| Omphil Care, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51603(U) [53 Misc 3d 146(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-2293 Q C
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered September 13, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. By order entered September 13, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.
For the reasons stated in Omphil Care, Inc., as Assignee of Paul Fabiola v Allstate Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op ____ [appeal No. 2013-2290 Q C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016
Reported in New York Official Reports at Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51602(U))
| Omphil Care, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51602(U) [53 Misc 3d 146(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-2290 Q C
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered September 13, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. By order entered September 13, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.
Plaintiff correctly contends that defendant’s cross-moving papers failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the denial of claim form had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). As a result, defendant did not demonstrate that it is not precluded from asserting its proffered defense. Consequently, defendant is not entitled to summary judgment. However, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its motion failed to establish that the claim at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).
Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016
Reported in New York Official Reports at 3 Star Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51609(U))
[*1]| 3 Star Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51609(U) [53 Misc 3d 146(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-2678 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered July 2, 2013. The judgment, entered pursuant to a decision of the same court dated March 19, 2013, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,690.
ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the decision dated March 19, 2013 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment entered July 2, 2013 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.
At the commencement of a nonjury trial in this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the parties stipulated that the sole issue was whether plaintiff had exhausted its remedies. The only witness at trial was an employee of defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC), who testified that plaintiff’s assignor was not a covered person because plaintiff had not established that its remedies against the owner of the vehicle had been exhausted.
Since plaintiff’s assignor was aware of the identity of the owner of the vehicle which plaintiff’s assignor was in at the time of the accident, plaintiff, as assignee, was required to exhaust its remedies against the vehicle’s owner before seeking relief from MVAIC (see Hauswirth v American Home Assur. Co., 244 AD2d 528 [1997]; Compas Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 42 Misc 3d 150[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50414[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). Here, plaintiff did not demonstrate that it had exhausted its remedies against the owner of the vehicle (see BLR Chiropractic, P.C. v MVAIC, 33 Misc 3d 131[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51878[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; see also BLR Chiropractic, P.C. v MVAIC, 36 Misc 3d 129[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52517[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016Daily Med. Equip. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51622(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Daily Med. Equip. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51622(U))
[*1]| Daily Med. Equip. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v MVAIC |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51622(U) [53 Misc 3d 148(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2014-492 Q C
against
MVAIC, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered February 3, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the compliant is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action was premature due to plaintiff’s failure to provide requested verification. By order entered February 3, 2014, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.
The papers submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion demonstrate that MVAIC neither denied the claims within 30 days of receiving them nor timely sought to extend its time to do so by requesting verification (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; 65-3.6 [b]; 65-3.8 [a] [1]). In New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (12 AD3d 429 [2004]), the Appellate Division rejected MVAIC’s contention, which MVAIC similarly asserts here, that the 30-day claim determination period does not begin to run until after MVAIC is satisfied that a claimant is a “qualified person” (see Insurance Law § 5202 [b]) who is also a “covered person” (see Insurance Law § 5221 [b] [2]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 12 AD3d 429). The Appellate Division held that defenses which are subject to preclusion remain subject to the time frames set forth in the regulations applicable to claims which seek to recover first-party no-fault benefits pursuant to Insurance Law article 51. As the initial request for verification in this action was sent more than 100 days after the last claim had been received by defendant, this action is not premature and, due to defendant’s failure to timely deny the claims at issue, defendant may not raise any defenses which are subject to preclusion (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 281 [1997]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 12 AD3d 429).
Plaintiff’s moving papers failed to demonstrate plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to [*2]summary judgment, because the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its motion did not establish that the claims at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denials of claim that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Nevertheless, as the record establishes that defendant has failed to timely deny the claims at issue or toll its time to do so by issuing timely requests for verification, and as defendant has not interposed a defense which is not subject to preclusion, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016B.Y., M.D., P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2016 NY Slip Op 51626(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at B.Y., M.D., P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2016 NY Slip Op 51626(U))
[*1]| B.Y., M.D., P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51626(U) [53 Misc 3d 148(A)] |
| Decided on November 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 1, 2016
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2014-1231 K C
against
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered April 9, 2014. The order denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, since plaintiffs and their assignors were aware of the identity of the owner of the vehicle in which the assignors had been passengers at the time of the accident, plaintiffs, as assignees, were required to exhaust their remedies against the vehicle’s owner before seeking relief from defendant (see Hauswirth v American Home Assur. Co., 244 AD2d 528 [1997]; Modern Art Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 22 Misc 3d 126[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52586[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Doctor Liliya Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 21 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52453[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Here, plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they had exhausted their remedies against the owner of the vehicle. Plaintiffs’ remaining contention lacks merit.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 01, 2016Central Park Physical Medicine & Rehab., P.C. v National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51598(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Central Park Physical Medicine & Rehab., P.C. v National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51598(U))
| Central Park Physical Medicine & Rehab., P.C. v National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 51598(U) [53 Misc 3d 145(A)] |
| Decided on October 31, 2016 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on October 31, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : IANNACCI, J.P., TOLBERT and GARGUILO, JJ.
2015-350 S C
against
National Liability & Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Second District (Carl J. Copertino, J.), dated December 23, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the fifth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, thirteenth and fifteenth causes of action.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, for summary judgment dismissing the fifth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, thirteenth and fifteenth causes of action on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). In opposition, plaintiff argued with respect to those causes of action that defendant had failed to establish that it had timely mailed its IME scheduling letters and denial of claim forms. By order dated December 23, 2014, the District Court, among other things, denied those branches of defendant’s motion.
Upon a review of the record, we find that defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that the IME scheduling letters at issue had been timely and properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Consequently, as defendant did not demonstrate that its 30-day period to pay or deny the claims had been tolled, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the fifth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, thirteenth and fifteenth causes of action.
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
Iannacci, J.P., Tolbert and Garguilo, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 31, 2016
Reported in New York Official Reports at Renelique v Lancer Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 51596(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
Lancer Insurance Co., Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered December 11, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant answered the complaint and served demands for discovery, including a notice to take the deposition of plaintiff. Thereafter, defendant moved, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, to compel plaintiff to provide discovery. Defendant argued in support of its motion that it sought plaintiff’s testimony as well as documentary evidence in connection with its defense that plaintiff was ineligible for reimbursement of no-fault benefits. By order entered March 31, 2014, the Civil Court granted defendant’s unopposed motion and directed plaintiff to “provide discovery responses to outstanding discovery demands within 60 days.”
When plaintiff’s time to respond had passed, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3126, on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the March 31, 2014 order. On September 9, 2014, plaintiff served its opposition to the motion along with written responses to defendant’s discovery demands. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court, entered December 11, 2014, which, among other things, granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint.
The determination of whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the motion court (see CPLR 3126; Orgel v Stewart Tit. Ins. Co., 91 AD3d 922 [2012], Giano v Ioannou, 78 AD3d 768 [2010], Fishbane v Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 AD3d 1079 [2009]; Mir v Saad, 54 AD3d 914 [2008]; see also Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]). Although dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith (see Rock City Sound, Inc. v Bashian & Farber, LLP, 83 AD3d 685 [2011]). In the case at bar, that plaintiff’s conduct was willful and contumacious can be inferred from its refusal to adequately comply with discovery requests, even after being directed to do so by court order, as well as from the absence of a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply (see Tos v Jackson Hgts. Care Ctr., LLC, 91 AD3d 943 [2012]; Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]).
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Weston and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 31, 2016