Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered December 21, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had timely and properly denied plaintiff’s claims at issue based on the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

With respect to the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through seventh causes of action, the evidence submitted by defendant was sufficient to demonstrate that the denial of claim forms as well as the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). As an assignor’s appearance at a duly scheduled IME “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (id. at 722), the Civil Court properly granted those branches of defendant’s motion.

As to the first cause of action, the record shows that defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, that it had timely denied the claim. Thus, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action should have been denied.

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are not properly before this court, as these arguments are being raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider them (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered January 31, 2013, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered February 15, 2013 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the January 13, 2013 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,991.99.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order entered January 13, 2013 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered January 13, 2013, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Defendant submitted sufficient proof to show that the independent medical examination (IME) scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled IMEs, had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant further demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had not appeared for the duly scheduled IMEs and, thus, that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, plaintiff’s motion should have been denied and defendant’s cross motion should have been granted.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered January 13, 2013 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), entered November 15, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, in that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms, or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests; and that defendant failed to prove that plaintiff willfully obstructed defendant’s investigation.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, the affidavits submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct the EUO of plaintiff on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear. Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Crescent Radiology, PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]). To the extent plaintiff asserts [*2]that defendant did not demonstrate that plaintiff’s failure to cooperate was willful, defendant complied with the regulations (see 11 NYCRR 65) and there is no requirement to establish willfulness (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [2011]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered June 14, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted a cross motion by defendant Esurance Insurance Company for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to, among other things, recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant Esurance Insurance Company (Esurance) cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted against it, arguing that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted Esurance’s cross motion.

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that Esurance mailed the EUO scheduling letters to the wrong address, and therefore that plaintiff’s motion should have been granted and Esurance’s cross motion denied. However, the record demonstrates conclusively that Esurance mailed the letters to the address provided by plaintiff on its bills and by plaintiff’s assignor on both her prescribed application for no-fault benefits (NF-2) and her signed assignment of benefits. Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated that Esurance did not give the assignor proper notice of the EUOs. Consequently, the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment against Esurance was properly denied and Esurance’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted against it was properly granted.

While plaintiff argues on appeal that the branch of its motion seeking summary judgment against its assignor should have been granted, it offers no reasoning in support of its argument. We note, however, that while plaintiff purports to sue its assignor pursuant to the assignment it received from the assignor, such a cause of action is based upon plaintiff’s own alleged rights against its assignor, and is not properly based upon the assignment.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered January 16, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The affidavit by defendant’s claims adjuster was sufficient to establish that defendant did not receive the claims at issue. However, as the affidavit by plaintiff’s billing manager demonstrated that the claim forms had been mailed to defendant, there is an issue of fact as to whether defendant’s time to pay or deny these claims ever began to run (see Healing Health Prods., Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 59 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; cf. Bright Med. Supply Co. v Tri State Consumer Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Consequently, the Civil Court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered March 6, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion, granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action as premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification, and granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the remaining causes of action due to the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs) and examinations under oath (EUOs).

In support of the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action, defendant submitted an affidavit by its claims examiner which established that defendant had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification request (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated prima facie that it had not received the requested verification and thus that plaintiff’s second cause of action is premature (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Civil Court properly granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing this cause of action.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that the IME and EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16), that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs and EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]), and that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta [*2]Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16) the claims underlying the remaining causes of action on that ground. Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722) and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the remaining causes of action.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered January 18, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The denial of claim forms at issue were untimely on their face. Plaintiff argues, among other things, that defendant failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint because defendant failed to demonstrate that it tolled its time to pay or deny the claims at issue by sending timely examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letters to plaintiff. A review of the record reveals that the EUO scheduling letters annexed in support of defendant’s motion identified the dates of loss, claim numbers and the names of eligible injured persons to which these EUO scheduling letters were applicable. As the annexed EUO scheduling letters do not include the name of plaintiff’s assignor, his date of loss or the claim number applicable to claims concerning him, defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that it tolled its time to pay or deny the claims at issue. In light of the foregoing, we need not pass upon plaintiff’s remaining arguments.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered February 20, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claims based on plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal with respect to the merits of defendant’s cross motion, defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered December 7, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The Civil Court denied both the motion and the cross motion, but, in effect, limited the issues for trial pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), stating that “the only issue for trial shall be medical necessity.” As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its motion for summary judgment.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff submitted two letters of medical necessity. However, as neither letter of medical necessity was sworn or even signed, they were of no probative value (see Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 45 [2012]). As a result, defendant’s prima facie showing that the services were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff. In view of the foregoing, and as plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.