Tam Med. Supply Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50369(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Tam Med. Supply Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50369(U))

Tam Med. Supply Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50369(U)) [*1]
Tam Med. Supply Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50369(U) [51 Misc 3d 127(A)]
Decided on March 16, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 16, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1497 Q C
Tam Medical Supply Corp., as Assignee of DOR GUY MARCEL, Appellant,

against

American Transit Ins. Co., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered May 22, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

In support of its cross motion, defendant established that it had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification request (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Defendant also demonstrated prima facie that it had not received the requested verification and, thus, that plaintiff’s action is premature (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). However, in opposition to the cross motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from plaintiff’s owner, which affidavit was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether this action is premature (see Healing Health Prods., Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 59 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 16, 2016
Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50367(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50367(U))

Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50367(U)) [*1]
Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50367(U) [51 Misc 3d 127(A)]
Decided on March 16, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 16, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1470 K C
Ultimate Health Products, Inc., as Assignee of PAUL LUCKNER, Appellant,

against

Hereford Insurance Co., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), entered June 6, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had established that there was no coverage for no-fault benefits since defendant had not issued an automobile insurance policy covering the underlying accident.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, a lack of coverage defense may be raised without regard to any issue as to the propriety or timeliness of an insurer’s denial of claim form (see Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 135-136 [1982] [lack of coverage defense is not precluded]; see also Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 [1997]). The papers submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion were sufficient to establish that the policy being sued upon was a workers’ compensation insurance policy which did not cover plaintiff’s claim to receive reimbursement of assigned first-party no-fault benefits. As plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of an applicable automobile insurance policy issued by defendant or to otherwise raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 16, 2016
Performance Plus Med., P.C. v Nationwide Ins. (2016 NY Slip Op 50366(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Performance Plus Med., P.C. v Nationwide Ins. (2016 NY Slip Op 50366(U))

Performance Plus Med., P.C. v Nationwide Ins. (2016 NY Slip Op 50366(U)) [*1]
Performance Plus Med., P.C. v Nationwide Ins.
2016 NY Slip Op 50366(U) [51 Misc 3d 127(A)]
Decided on March 16, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 16, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1461 K C
Performance Plus Medical, P.C. as Assignee of FABIOLA NOEL, Appellant,

against

Nationwide Ins., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered May 31, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Since a claim need not be paid or denied until all demanded verification with respect thereto has been provided (see Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553, 554 [1999]), a timely verification request tolls an insurer’s time to pay or deny the entire claim. Thus, any action to recover payment on that claim is premature when the provider has failed to respond to a request for verification (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492, 493 [2005]). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention on appeal, defendant’s moving papers were sufficient to establish defendant’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the second through tenth causes of action on the ground that defendant had not received the requested verification.

With respect to the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, the affidavit by defendant’s claims representative was sufficient to demonstrate prima facie that defendant had properly denied the claims for the services at issue in the first cause of action pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule. In opposition to this branch of defendant’s motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 16, 2016
Matter of Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 01855)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 01855)

Matter of Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 01855)
Matter of Singh v Allstate Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 01855 [137 AD3d 1046]
March 16, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, April 27, 2016

[*1]

 In the Matter of Tara Singh, Appellant,
v
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.

Law Offices of Hersh Jakubowitz, PLLC, Flushing, NY (David Jakubowitz of counsel), for appellant.

Peter C. Merani, P.C., New York, NY (Josh Youngman and Eric Wahrburg of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate four master arbitration awards, all dated July 28, 2014, which affirmed four arbitration awards, all dated April 14, 2014, denying the petitioner’s no-fault claims for lost wages incurred as a result of an automobile accident, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), entered December 15, 2014, which denied her petition to vacate the four master arbitration awards and confirmed the four master arbitration awards.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“ ’Consistent with the public policy in favor of arbitration, the grounds specified in CPLR 7511 for vacating or modifying a no-fault arbitration award are few in number and narrowly applied’ ” (Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Westchester Med. Group, M.D., 125 AD3d 649, 650 [2015], quoting Matter of Mercury Cas. Co. v Healthmakers Med. Group, P.C., 67 AD3d 1017, 1017 [2009]). Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any ground for vacating the subject master arbitration awards. In addition, the determinations of the master arbitrator confirming the original arbitration awards had evidentiary support and a rational basis (see Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 231-232 [1982]; Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 211 [1981]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and confirmed the master arbitration awards. Rivera, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Barros, JJ., concur.

Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50330(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50330(U))

Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50330(U)) [*1]
Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50330(U) [50 Misc 3d 148(A)]
Decided on March 15, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 15, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1479 Q C
Ultimate Health Products, Inc. as Assignee of Tamezan Osmali, Appellant,

against

American Transit Ins. Co., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Barry A. Schwartz, J.), entered May 10, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claim based on plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Since defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123) the claim on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled EUOs, defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722). As plaintiff, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 15, 2016
GBI Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50329(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at GBI Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50329(U))

GBI Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50329(U)) [*1]
GBI Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50329(U) [50 Misc 3d 148(A)]
Decided on March 15, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 15, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1477 K C
GBI Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Brenetta Selver, Appellant, 

against

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered April 30, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule applicable to chiropractors who render the same services as acupuncturists to reimburse plaintiff for the acupuncture services plaintiff had rendered. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff argues on appeal, as it did in the Civil Court, that defendant failed to establish that its fee schedule reductions were proper. We disagree and find that defendant demonstrated that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 15, 2016
Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50321(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50321(U))

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C., as Assignee of Thania Chanlette, Appellant,

against

Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered May 9, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate a prior order of the same court (Reginald A. Boddie, J.) entered August 8, 2012 which granted, on default, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order entered May 9, 2014 is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that the claims at issue had been timely and properly denied based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On February 17, 2012, the return date of the motion, the parties stipulated that plaintiff would serve any written opposition to the motion and/or a cross motion by June 8, 2012, and that the return date of the motion would be adjourned to August 8, 2012. No written opposition was filed by the return date, and the Civil Court (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), in an order entered August 8, 2012, granted defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

On August 23, 2013, plaintiff moved to vacate the August 8, 2012 order, stating that plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious opposition to defendant’s motion. Plaintiff’s counsel, in a supporting affirmation, conceded that plaintiff had received notice of the entry of the order on August 23, 2012. She further stated that the default was a result of her extensive workload, and that “there was no briefing schedule scanned into our system for the submission for written opposition.” In addition, plaintiff had a meritorious opposition to defendant’s motion in that defendant had failed to establish that the EUO scheduling letters had been properly addressed and timely mailed, and that the assignor had failed to appear at the EUOs. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion.

In an order entered May 9, 2014, the Civil Court (Katherine A. Levine, J.) denied plaintiff’s motion on the ground that the motion was properly one for reargument and, therefore, should have been made before Judge Boddie. Plaintiff appeals from the May 9, 2014 order, and we affirm, albeit for reasons other than those stated by the Civil Court.

Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, vacatur of an order granted upon the default of a party in opposing a motion should be sought by a motion pursuant to CPLR 5015, [*2]not by a motion for leave to renew or reargue (see e.g. Raciti v Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 AD3d 1014 [2008]; Friendly Physician, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 129[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51772[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). In addition, there is no requirement that a motion to vacate an order made upon default be made to the judge who signed the prior order (see CPLR 2221 [a] [1]; Patron v Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 129 AD2d 572 [1987]). Consequently, the Civil Court incorrectly determined that plaintiff’s motion was actually a motion for leave to reargue which should have been made before Judge Boddie.

In order to vacate the August 8, 2012 order based upon excusable default (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]), plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion (see Thapt v Lutheran Med. Ctr., 89 AD3d 837 [2011]; Bazoyah v Herschitz, 79 AD3d 1081 [2010]; Raciti v Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 AD3d 1014; Montague v Rivera, 50 AD3d 656 [2008]; St. Rose v McMorrow, 43 AD3d 1146 [2007]). Plaintiff’s excuse—that the default was a result of plaintiff’s counsel’s heavy caseload and the failure to scan the motion schedule into the office’s computer system—amounts to a claim of law office failure. As such excuse was vague, undetailed and unsubstantiated, it did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the default (see Chechen v Spencer, 68 AD3d 801 [2009]; Murray v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 52 AD3d 792, 793 [2008]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v Blue Ridge Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 946, 947 [2005]). Furthermore, plaintiff failed to explain its one-year delay, following its receipt of notice of the entry of the default order, in moving to vacate that order (see e.g. Johnson v Nello Homes, Inc., 159 AD2d 562 [1990]).

Moreover, plaintiff did not demonstrate a potentially meritorious opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We find no merit to plaintiff’s contentions that defendant failed to establish that the EUO scheduling letters had been properly addressed and timely mailed, or that the assignor had failed to appear at the EUOs. In support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit of its administrative assistant and an affidavit of its Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigator, accompanied by certified transcripts made after the assignor’s EUO nonappearances. These documents sufficiently described the standard practices and procedures of defendant’s office for proper and timely mailing of the EUO scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; ARCO Med. NY, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52382[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]) and established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for either of the two duly scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]; Olmeur Med., P.C. v Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 143[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52031[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]), thereby demonstrating that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722).

Accordingly, the May 9, 2014 order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 11, 2016
Bay LS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50319(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Bay LS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50319(U))

Bay LS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50319(U)) [*1]
Bay LS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50319(U) [50 Misc 3d 147(A)]
Decided on March 11, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 11, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : WESTON, J.P., PESCE and ALIOTTA, JJ.
2014-1121 K C
Bay LS Medical Supplies, Inc., as Assignee of Pablo Lozano-Reyes, Respondent,

against

Allstate Insurance Company, Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered November 1, 2013. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting plaintiff’s motion and denying defendant’s cross motion.

Defendant established that it had timely and properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) its EUO scheduling letters and its denial of claim forms, which denied the claims on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear at duly scheduled EUOs. Although the Civil Court found that defendant had established plaintiff’s nonappearances, the court held, as plaintiff argues, that defendant’s EUO scheduling letters were defective. However, under the circumstances presented, as plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to defendant’s EUO requests, plaintiff’s objections regarding the EUO scheduling letters will not be heard (see Eagle Surgical Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 46 Misc 3d 128[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51798[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). In light of the foregoing, defendant’s cross motion should have been granted. We pass on no other issue.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 11, 2016
Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Esurance Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50315(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Esurance Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50315(U))

Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Esurance Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50315(U)) [*1]
Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Esurance Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50315(U) [50 Misc 3d 147(A)]
Decided on March 11, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 11, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1480 K C
Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. as Assignee of Kareem Hoyte, Appellant,

against

Esurance Ins. Co., Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered August 1, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the affidavit of defendant’s employee was sufficient to establish the mailing of the EUO scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]).

Plaintiff also argues that the affirmation by the managing partner of defendant’s law firm, which had been retained to conduct the EUOs, did not establish that the assignor had failed to appear for the EUOs. This argument lacks merit, as that affirmation was not the proof submitted by defendant to establish the assignor’s failure to appear.

As plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any basis to disturb the Civil Court’s order, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 11, 2016
EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50314(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50314(U))

EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50314(U)) [*1]
EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 50314(U) [50 Misc 3d 147(A)]
Decided on March 11, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 11, 2016

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-1458 K C
EMC Health Products, Inc. as Assignee of Peter Esquilin, Appellant, 

against

Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered May 10, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant did not provide insurance coverage for the vehicle in question on the date of the accident at issue. By order entered May 10, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

In support of its cross motion and in opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by its employee, who described the details of a record search which she had performed and stated that her search had revealed that there was no Allstate Insurance Company policy covering the vehicle in question on the date of the accident. We find that defendant’s affidavit was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of a covered incident (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: March 11, 2016