Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered March 10, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fifth causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of plaintiff’s first cause of action as sought to recover for services rendered on July 8, 2010 is denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fifth causes of action.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the denial of claim forms had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and to demonstrate that defendant had fully paid plaintiff for the services billed for under CPT codes 97810 and 97811 in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule. However, plaintiff correctly argues that defendant did not proffer sufficient evidence to warrant the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for the initial acupuncture visit on July 8, 2010 (cf. Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of plaintiff’s first cause of action as sought to recover for services rendered on July 8, 2010 is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered March 17, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff properly argues on appeal that defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, its defense that the fees charged exceeded the amounts set forth in the workers’ compensation fee schedule (see Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered March 14, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the verification requests and denial of claim forms had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). As defendant demonstrated that it received the requested verification on May 28, 2013, the claims were timely denied.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered February 27, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that initial and follow-up verifications requests had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and to demonstrate that defendant had not received the requested verification, and, thus, that plaintiff’s action is premature (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). However, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from plaintiff’s owner, which, as plaintiff argues, was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether this action is premature (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered February 19, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through tenth causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment on the second through tenth causes of action are denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through tenth causes of action. Defendant’s motion was based on the defense that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule.

Plaintiff correctly argues on appeal that the affidavits submitted by defendant did not sufficiently set forth a standard office practice or procedure that would ensure that the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Thus, defendant did not demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the second through tenth causes of action.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment on the second through tenth causes of action are denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered January 30, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first, and third through seventh, causes of action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first, and third through seventh, causes of action.

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument with respect to the claim underlying the first cause of action, defendant sufficiently described its practices and procedures for receipt of mail and demonstrated, prima facie, that it had not received this claim. Contrary to plaintiff’s further argument, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it had mailed this claim to defendant. While plaintiff submitted an affidavit by its owner, that affidavit alleges that this claim was mailed almost a month before the services set forth in that claim were provided. Moreover, while plaintiff attached to its opposition papers the claims allegedly sent to defendant, there was no claim attached matching the amount sought in the first cause of action.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments with respect to the third through seventh causes of action, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that initial and follow-up verification requests had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and to demonstrate that defendant had not received the requested verification and, thus, that those causes of action are premature (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered January 28, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff correctly argues that defendant’s motion papers failed to establish that the denial of claim forms at issue had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Consequently, defendant failed to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, as the proof submitted in support of its motion did not establish either that defendant had failed to deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered January 21, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff properly argues on appeal that defendant failed to establish its defense, that the fees charged exceeded the amounts set forth in the workers’ compensation fee schedule, as a matter of law (see Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). For example, defendant failed to demonstrate that it had used the correct conversion factor in calculating the reimbursement rate. In addition, defendant sought to demonstrate that plaintiff was not entitled to any payment for services rendered by plaintiff on specific dates because defendant had already paid another provider, Harvard Medical, P.C., for eight units of physical medicine procedures and/or modalities, the full number of units permitted by Physical Medicine Ground Rule 11, for each of those dates. However, the documents relied upon by defendant were attached to the motion papers without authentication, foundation or even discussion. Even if we were to take the documents at face value, they show only that Harvard Medical, P.C. had billed for a total of three units for each of the applicable dates.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.