Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered December 11, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff billed for one unit of CPT code 99244 at $236.94 and one unit of CPT code 20553 at $600. Defendant defended this action on the ground that the fees sought exceeded the amounts permitted for those codes by the workers’ compenCsation fee schedule. While plaintiff argues on appeal that the affidavit executed by defendant’s coding expert “does not discuss anything specific whatsoever regarding [p]laintiff’s claims,” defendant also submitted an affidavit executed by its no-fault examiner, who described how the fees for the services at issue had been calculated by multiplying the appropriate “relative value” by the appropriate “conversion factor.” Plaintiff’s remaining argument with respect to the coding expert’s affidavit and the specific argument made by plaintiff with regard to CPT code 99244 were not raised in the Civil Court, and are therefore not properly before this court.

With respect to plaintiff’s final argument, which involves CPT code 20553, we find that defendant made a prima facie showing that it had used the assigned relative value for that code to calculate the sum to which plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed. While plaintiff submitted a doctor’s affidavit addressing CPT code 20553, the doctor’s conclusion is based upon the unsupported allegation that CPT code 20553 is a “by report” code, meaning that it does not have a relative value. This allegation does not rebut defendant’s proof that CPT code 20553 does have a relative value.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered January 7, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, imposed conditions.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the conditions imposed by the Civil Court are vacated.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on condition that plaintiff’s assignor fail to appear for a new examination under oath (EUO) to be “re-notice[d]” by defendant in accordance with instructions set out in the order. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as imposed those conditions.

Appearance at an EUO is a condition precedent to coverage (see 11 NYCRR 65—1.1; Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596 [2014]; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Upon finding that defendant demonstrated that it had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled EUOs, the Civil Court should not have given plaintiff’s assignor an opportunity to cure its failure to act during claims processing (see IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v Stracar Med. Services, P.C., 116 AD3d 1005 [2014]). Under the circumstances, the court should have granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment unconditionally.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and the conditions imposed by the Civil Court are vacated.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered December 10, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claim at issue based upon the assignor’s failure to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal with respect to defendant’s cross motion, defendant’s submissions were sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the IME scheduling letters and the denial of claim form had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered December 5, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the IME scheduling letters and the denial of claim form at issue had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Plaintiff’s argument, that the address used on the IME scheduling letters improperly included an apartment number that does not appear on plaintiff’s claim forms, will not be considered, as it is being raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]; Mind & Body Acupuncture, P.C. v Elrac, Inc., 48 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51219[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). In any event, the affidavit of defendant’s litigation examiner stated that defendant used the address set forth on the assignor’s application for no-fault benefits.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered September 19, 2013. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied both motions, but, in effect, limited the issue for trial, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), to whether the EUO scheduling letters had been properly mailed. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment.

The proof submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion failed to establish a practice and procedure sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the EUO scheduling letters had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; J.M. Chiropractic Servs., PLLC v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 135[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51348[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Barry A. Schwartz, J.), entered October 16, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

For the reasons stated in Metro Health Prods., Inc. as Assignee of Omar Boyce, v American Tr. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op ___ [appeal No. 2013-2498 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered July 17, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letters had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and to demonstrate that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered June 21, 2013. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from October 27, 2008 to April 23, 2009.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from October 27, 2008 to April 23, 2009 is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on various grounds, including lack of medical necessity. As to so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from October 27, 2008 to April 23, 2009, the Civil Court denied both the motion and the cross motion, but limited the issues for trial to the medical necessity of those claims (see CPLR 3212 [g]). As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied the branch of its cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those claims.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted a sworn report of an independent medical examination, which report set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the examiner’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. Plaintiff failed to oppose defendant’s cross motion. As defendant’s prima facie showing that the services were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff, and as plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment on the claims at issue, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from October 27, 2008 to April 23, 2009 is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.