Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered February 3, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to provide discovery, pursuant to an order of the same court (Richard G. Latin, J.) entered July 28, 2014, to the extent of directing plaintiff to serve responses to certain enumerated demands within 60 days.

ORDERED that the order entered February 3, 2015, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant, on December 5, 2013, served an answer and demands for discovery including “supplemental combined demands.” Plaintiff did not provide the requested discovery but, instead, moved for summary judgment. Thereafter, defendant cross-moved, among other things, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff to respond to the discovery demands. Plaintiff served papers in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, which included incomplete responses to the discovery demands. By order entered July 28, 2014, the Civil Court (Richard G. Latin, J.) granted defendant’s cross motion to the extent of directing plaintiff to provide responses to the “supplemental combined demands” within 60 days. The order and notice of its entry were served on plaintiff’s counsel on August 5, 2014. Plaintiff did not serve the ordered discovery responses but, instead, served a notice of trial and certificate of readiness, which defendant’s attorneys received approximately one week later, on August 13, 2014.

Defendant then moved, pursuant to CPLR 3126, to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness, or, in the alternative, to direct plaintiff to provide discovery responses, in accordance with the Civil Court’s July 28, 2014 order. Plaintiff opposed the motion and annexed responses which consisted primarily of objections to the “supplemental combined demands.” Plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Jodi Orlow, J.) entered February 3, 2015 as granted defendant’s motion to the extent of directing plaintiff to provide, within 60 days, responses to certain enumerated discovery demands and stated that the action would be dismissed based upon an affirmation of noncompliance by defense counsel.

Since the demands for discovery were served on plaintiff’s counsel on December 5, 2013 [*2]and plaintiff did not challenge the propriety of the demands within the time prescribed by CPLR 3122 (a), plaintiff is obligated to produce the information sought by defendant except as to matters which are palpably improper or privileged (see Fausto v City of New York, 17 AD3d 520 [2005]; Marino v County of Nassau, 16 AD3d 628 [2005]; AVA Acupuncture, P.C. v AutoOne Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 134[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51350[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Plaintiff has failed to establish that the discovery demands at issue seek information which is palpably improper or privileged. In light of the foregoing and the Civil Court order entered July 28, 2014, and as plaintiff’s remaining contentions lack merit, we find no basis to disturb the February 3, 2015 order, insofar as appealed from.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 8, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

[*1]

The Rybak Firm, PLLC, Brooklyn (Maksim Leyvi of counsel), for appellants.

Rubin, Fiorella & Friedman LLP, New York (Harlan R. Schreiber of counsel), for respondent.

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Anil C. Singh, J.), entered February 19, 2015, to the extent appealed from, granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and declaring that plaintiff is not obligated to provide no-fault benefits to defendants Adelaida Physical Therapy, P.C., Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C., Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC, Maiga Products Corp., and TAM Medical Supply Corp. as a result of a motor vehicle accident, due to claimants’ failure to appear for their scheduled examinations under oath (EUO), unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the judgment vacated and the motion denied.

Although the failure of a person eligible for no-fault benefits to appear for a properly noticed EUO constitutes a breach of a condition precedent, vitiating coverage (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1; see also Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2015]; Allstate Ins. Co. v Pierre, 123 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2014]), plaintiff failed to supply sufficient evidence to enable the court to determine whether the notices it had served on the injury claimants for EUOs were subject to the timeliness requirements of 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (b) and 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 (b) (see Mapfre Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Manoo, 140 AD3d 468, 470 [1st Dept 2016]) and, if so, whether the notices had been served in conformity with those requirements (see National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v Tam Med. Supply Corp., 131 AD3d 851 [1st Dept 2015]). Specifically, plaintiff failed to provide copies of any completed verification forms it may have received from any of the health service provider defendants or any other evidence reflective of the dates on which plaintiff had received any such verification forms, or otherwise assert that it never received such forms. Thus, plaintiff failed to meet its burden of establishing either that the EUOs were not subject to the procedures and time frames set forth in the no-fault implementing regulations or that it properly noticed the EUOs in conformity with their terms (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011], lv [*2]denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; Allstate Ins. Co. v Pierre, 123 AD3d at 618).

In view of our disposition, we need not reach defendants’ remaining contentions. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Moskowitz, Gische, Kahn and Gesmer, JJ.

[*1]

Supreme Court, Nassau County, February 1, 2017

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, for plaintiff.

Law Offices of Printz & Goldstein, Woodbury, for defendant.

The motion by the plaintiff, St. Barnabas Hospital, as assignee of Dawn Henry (motion sequence No. 01), seeking an order pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting it summary judgment against the defendant, Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO), and the cross motion by the defendant, GEICO (motion sequence No. 02), seeking an order pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting it summary judgment and dismissing the complaint, are determined as hereinafter provided.

This is an action to recover no-fault benefits on a hospital no-fault billing. The plaintiff, St. Barnabas, is the assignee for health-related services rendered to GEICO’s insured, Dawn Henry, during the period of April 10, 2016 through April 13, 2016, for injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 10, 2016. At issue is whether the defendant, GEICO, timely and properly requested additional verification from the plaintiff, St. Barnabas, upon its receipt of proof of the claim which effectively tolls the 30-day time period within which GEICO must pay or deny the claim for such services rendered in the amount of $43,212.59.

On April 21, 2016, the plaintiff, St. Barnabas, billed the defendant, GEICO, utilizing a hospital facility form (form NF-5) and a UB-04, seeking payment of a hospital bill in the sum of $43,212.59 (see exhibit 1 attached to plaintiff’s motion). The billing was sent via certified mail, return receipt requested, and was received by the defendant, GEICO, on April 25, 2016 (see exhibit 2 attached to plaintiff’s motion). On May 16, 2016, GEICO served a request for additional verification. On May 20, 2016, St. Barnabas served a response letter acknowledging receipt of GEICO’s request wherein it objected to the validity of the request. GEICO received St. Barnabas’ response on May 23, 2016. On June 20, 2016, GEICO served a second follow-up request for additional verification. St. Barnabas never responded to GEICO’s second request. The instant action was filed shortly thereafter.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, GEICO, failed to either pay the hospital bill or issue a timely denial. In opposition,{**55 Misc 3d at 787} the defendant, GEICO, contends that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the grounds that (i) the plaintiff failed to show the claims were not denied within 30 days or that the basis for the denial was conclusory, vague or had no merit; (ii) the plaintiff’s supporting affidavit is deficient in that it cannot be demonstrated that the affiant, employed by a third-party claims administrator, has personal knowledge of the hospital’s practices or procedures and as such cannot establish that the bills are in fact business records of the hospital; and (iii) the plaintiff’s affiant failed to establish proper proof of mailing.

The defendant, GEICO, also cross-moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to provide all items requested by GEICO that were necessary to verify the claim, pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (a) (1), and which GEICO was entitled to receive pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (c). GEICO claims that the 30-day period within which the claim must be paid or denied was tolled due to its request for additional verification of the claim within 15 business days from GEICO’s receipt of proof of the claim.

Upon receipt of proof of the claim from St. Barnabas, GEICO alleges that it timely made a request for additional verification, specifically seeking a breakdown of which services constituted necessary emergency health services in order to issue appropriate payment on the claim (see aff of Kristen Savold ¶ 18 [B], annexed to defendant’s cross motion as exhibit B). In support of its cross motion, GEICO submits the State of New York Insurance Department’s Circular Letter No. 4 (2011) which partially amended section 5103 (b) (2) of the Insurance Law to prohibit a no-fault insurer from excluding from coverage necessary emergency health services rendered in a general hospital for any person who is injured as a result of operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition or while the person’s ability to operate the vehicle is impaired by the use of a drug within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. Circular Letter No. 4 further provides:

“For the purposes of compliance with Chapter 303, the Department interprets ‘necessary emergency health services’ to mean services rendered to a person by or under the supervision of a physician, paramedic, or emergency medical technician to treat the onset of sudden pain or injury and to stabilize the person, provided the person is transported{**55 Misc 3d at 788} directly from the scene of the motor vehicle accident to the general hospital. Pursuant to this interpretation, once the sudden pain or injury is treated and the person is stabilized, (generally in the emergency room) the no-fault insurance coverage ceases. In order to facilitate timely payment, a hospital should specify what portion of the bill consists of ‘necessary emergency health services.’ If the hospital does not specify what portion consists of ‘necessary emergency health services,’ then a no-fault insurer may request this information.” (See letter from GEICO to St. Barnabas dated May 16, 2016; NY St Ins Dept 2011 Circular Letter No. 4, RE: No-Fault Intoxication Coverage; Chapter 303 of the Laws of 2010, annexed to defendant’s cross motion as exhibit B.)

GEICO referenced the foregoing language from Circular Letter No. 4 in its letter requesting additional verification. GEICO specified in its request that St. Barnabas provide a “breakdown of charges up to where the patient was found to be stabilized.”

In its response, St. Barnabas stated that GEICO’s “request for a ‘breakdown of charges up to where the patient was found to be stabilized’ is not required under the insurance regulations or no fault law.” (See St. Barnabas response letter dated May 20, 2016, annexed to defendant’s cross motion as exhibit B.) St. Barnabas further responded that “[t]he patient received ‘Necessary Emergency Health Services’ during h[er] admission at the hospital.” (Id.)

The defendant, GEICO, further submits that it followed up with St. Barnabas for a second request for additional verification. To date, St. Barnabas has not responded to GEICO’s follow-up request.

GEICO also submits that it had a good faith basis for requesting additional verification of the bill at issue. In support of its cross motion, GEICO proffers the toxicology report for the insured provided by St. Barnabas with its bill, which shows that the patient had a blood alcohol level of .15% and tested positive for THC, an active ingredient in the drug marijuana, at the time of her admission to the emergency room. GEICO further proffers the physician affirmation of Dr. Kenneth Marici (see Dr. Marici affirmation and toxicology report, annexed to defendant’s cross motion as exhibit E). Based on the intoxication exclusion in GEICO’s policy, GEICO contends that the insured’s injuries are excluded from coverage (see{**55 Misc 3d at 789} policy endorsement, annexed to defendant’s cross motion as exhibit D). Thus, GEICO argues that its obligation to pay the plaintiff’s claim was limited to those items deemed “necessary emergency health services” and that it timely and properly requested additional verification from St. Barnabas in this regard.

GEICO argues that its timely request for additional verification indefinitely tolled the 30-day time period within which an insurer must pay or deny a claim until its receipt of the information requested. GEICO further argues that it would be inequitable for a provider to be rewarded for its failure to adequately respond to numerous timely requests for verification, relying upon Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co. (67 AD3d 862 [2d Dept 2009]). Thus, GEICO posits that St. Barnabas’ action is premature since it failed to properly respond to GEICO’s request for verification, relying upon Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (44 AD3d 903 [2d Dept 2007]). Based on the evidence presented, GEICO seeks a determination that the hospital bill is not yet overdue and for this court to dismiss the complaint.

In opposition and reply, the plaintiff, St. Barnabas, contends that it demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the requisite billing form, the affidavit of its third-party biller, and confirmation that the plaintiff’s hospital bill, form NF-5, was received by the defendant. St. Barnabas further asserts that GEICO is precluded from interposing any defenses due to its failure to either pay or deny the claim within 30 calendar days after it received proof of the claim.

With regard to GEICO’s claim that it timely and properly requested additional verification, counsel for St. Barnabas mimics the hospital’s verification response letter stating that “there is no authority in the Insurance Law, No-Fault Regulations, or in case law which shows that the defendant’s verification request was proper.” (See plaintiff’s opposition to cross motion ¶ 29.) In support of its claim that the verification request was not proper, St. Barnabas’ counsel relies upon various statutory provisions that set forth the fee schedule and inpatient hospital billing pursuant to which claims must be paid.

Notably, St. Barnabas concedes that “regarding the defendant’s request for a ‘breakdown of charges up to the point where the patient was found to be stabilized,’ Insurance Law § 5103 (b) (2) was amended and took effect on January 26, 2011.” (Id.{**55 Misc 3d at 790} ¶ 44.) St. Barnabas agrees that the law was amended to prohibit insurers from excluding from coverage payment for “necessary emergency health care services” when a patient is intoxicated by alcohol or drugs. However, St. Barnabas finds untenable the defendant’s position that insurers are only required to pay for care until the patient is stabilized, claiming that GEICO has impermissibly interpreted the statutory language. St. Barnabas further submits that in this case, the patient was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident involving multiple injuries, and that “[t]his period of time was the patient’s treatment for ‘necessary emergency health care services.’ ” St. Barnabas contends that it “fully responded to the Defendant’s alleged verification requests.”

The court notes that St. Barnabas’ papers are silent as to Circular Letter No. 4 and the specific language permitting no-fault insurers to request additional information to ascertain which services are in fact “necessary emergency health services.”

Legal Analysis

It is well settled that the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact (Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Bhatti v Roche, 140 AD2d 660 [2d Dept 1988]). To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must establish its claim or defense by tendering sufficient evidentiary proof, in admissible form, sufficient to warrant the court, as a matter of law, to direct judgment in the movant’s favor (Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065 [1979]).

A provider of medical services can establish a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment by submitting proof that the requisite claim forms were mailed and received by the carrier and that payment is overdue (Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 729 [2d Dept 2007]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 40 AD3d 981 [2d Dept 2007]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 492 [2d Dept 2006]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2d Dept 2004]). Pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (a) (1), “No-fault benefits are overdue if not paid within 30 calendar days after{**55 Misc 3d at 791} the insurer receives proof of claim, which shall include verification of all . . . the relevant information requested pursuant to section 65-3.5 of this Subpart” (see also Insurance Law § 5106; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274 [1997]). An insurer can extend this 30-day time frame by making a timely request for additional verification of the claim “within 15 business days” after receipt thereof (Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co., 67 AD3d 862 [2d Dept 2009]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]).

If a sufficient prima facie showing is demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact, the existence of which necessarily precludes the granting of summary judgment and necessitates a trial (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980], supra).

The plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim to recover no-fault medical payments. The plaintiff’s claim is premature as the evidence presented demonstrates that the 30-day time period within which an insurer must pay or deny a claim has not been triggered. In turn, the plaintiff failed to sufficiently respond to the defendant’s requests for additional verification.

The plaintiff’s position that the verification request was improper because it is not required under the insurance regulations or no-fault law is without merit. The defendant, GEICO, referenced Circular Letter No. 4 dated January 12, 2011, issued by the State of New York Insurance Department, in its original request for additional verification. The purpose of the Circular Letter is to advise no-fault insurers and health insurers of the amendment of Insurance Law § 5103 (b) (2) and to interpret the regulations related thereto. While the plaintiff concedes that the law was amended in January 2011 to reflect that insurers are prohibited from excluding from coverage necessary emergency health services even where the patient was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs, the plaintiff fails to address the portion of the Circular Letter at issue here. Specifically, the plaintiff submits no argument or opposition with regard to the portion of the Circular Letter that permits a no-fault insurer to request a hospital to specify what portion of the bill consists of “necessary emergency health services.” Rather, the plaintiff claims that the statutory language does not explicitly provide as such. The court disagrees. 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (c) provides{**55 Misc 3d at 792} that “[t]he insurer is entitled to receive all items necessary to verify the claim directly from the parties from whom such verification was requested.”

The court also disagrees with the plaintiff’s contention that it fully responded to the defendant’s verification requests by merely stating, “[t]he patient received ‘Necessary Emergency Health Services’ during h[er] admission at the hospital.” The plaintiff’s response is vague in that it fails to delineate whether some, most or all of the services were in fact “necessary emergency health services.” Further, in its Circular Letter, the Insurance Department contemplated the need for hospitals to specify what portion of the bill consists of such emergency services. The Insurance Department also defined “necessary emergency health services” as sudden pain or injury that is treated until the patient is stabilized, generally in the emergency room.

In the matter sub judice, the patient was admitted to St. Barnabas for approximately three days from April 10, 2016 through April 13, 2016. The defendant, GEICO, submitted sufficient proof in admissible form showing that the patient was intoxicated by alcohol and marijuana at the time of the accident. As such, GEICO was entitled to request information concerning the breakdown of services until the patient was found to be stabilized in accordance with Insurance Law § 5103 (b) (2), as amended, and the related Circular Letter No. 4 interpreting the statute. Such information would permit GEICO to assess when the no-fault insurance coverage ceases, if at all, and the appropriate amount of the claim that must be paid.

Pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 (b), where there is a timely original request for verification, but no response to the request for verification is received within 30 calendar days thereafter, or the response to the original request for verification is incomplete, then the insurer, within 10 calendar days after the expiration of that 30-day period, must follow up with a second request for verification. When a no-fault medical service provider fails to respond or inadequately responds to two timely verification requests, the 30 days in which to pay or deny the claim is tolled and does not begin to run. Accordingly, any claim for payment by the medical service provider after two timely requests for verification is premature (see Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 AD3d 157 [2d Dept 2013]).

Thus, as the defendant correctly maintains, the plaintiff’s initial claim for payment was premature and was not complete{**55 Misc 3d at 793} until the defendant received additional verification of the claim as requested (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; [b] [3]; Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 AD3d 569 [2d Dept 2005]).

Where, as here, the insurer presents sufficient evidence that it timely requested additional verification and the hospital fails to provide the information requested, the complaint must be dismissed as premature (St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 338 [2d Dept 2002]).

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff’s motion (motion sequence No. 01) seeking summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3212, is denied; and it is further ordered that the defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3212, is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Decided on January 20, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on January 20, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered August 22, 2014. The judgment entered pursuant to an order of the same court dated July 2, 2014 granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $549.18.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order dated July 2, 2014 as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground, among others, that the assignor’s failure to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs) violated a condition precedent to coverage, which provided defendant with a basis for its founded belief that the underlying accident was not a covered event. In the alternative, defendant’s cross motion sought a stay of the action pending the determination of a Supreme Court declaratory judgment action involving the same accident, medical provider and assignor. By order dated July 2, 2014, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion, and denied defendant’s cross motion on the ground that defendant had failed to demonstrate that the assignor had failed to appear at two scheduled EUOs. A judgment was subsequently entered in plaintiff’s favor on August 22, 2014, from which defendant appeals.

Upon a review of the record, we find that plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish either that defendant had failed to deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie case.

In papers submitted in support of defendant’s cross motion, it was alleged that defendant had requested that the assignor appear for scheduled EUOs and that, although several EUOs had been rescheduled at the request of the assignor’s attorney, the assignor had ultimately failed to appear at the EUO scheduled on August 28, 2012, which EUO had not been rescheduled. [*2]Defendant’s papers further stated that defendant had subsequently mailed a denial of claim form to plaintiff which denied plaintiff’s claim on the ground that its assignor had failed to appear at EUOs. Inasmuch as defendant’s papers did not establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for two duly scheduled EUOs, the Civil Court correctly found that defendant had failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014]; Vladenn Med. Supply Corp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 129[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50928[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

We pass on no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order dated July 2, 2014 as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Solomon, J.P., Weston and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Decided on January 20, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.), entered May 6, 2015. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment, which had been denied by an order of the same court (Larry Love, J.) entered March 7, 2013.

ORDERED that the order entered May 6, 2015 is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant cross-moved for a stay, arguing that there was a question as to whether plaintiff’s assignor had been injured during the course of his employment, thereby requiring that the matter be submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board). In an order entered March 7, 2013, the Civil Court (Larry Love, J.) denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion, finding that, since there was an issue of fact as to whether the accident had occurred in the course of the assignor’s employment, Board resolution was required. The order further stated that should the matter not be filed with the Board “within 90 days of this order, the action may be dismissed, absent any good cause from the plaintiff.”

Approximately 21 months later, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Civil Court’s March 7, 2013 order, i.e., to demonstrate by June 7, 2013 (90 days from the date of the court’s order) that an application to the Board had been made. Plaintiff cross-moved for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment based on “new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination (CPLR 2221 [e] [2]).” In support of renewal, plaintiff offered, among other things, an affidavit by a paralegal of plaintiff’s counsel’s firm, who had requested that a Board employee conduct a search of plaintiff’s assignor’s name in the Board’s database, which found no record of plaintiff’s assignor having made an application for workers’ compensation benefits. From this “new evidence,” plaintiff concluded that the matter was not subject to or covered by the Workers’ Compensation Law and that there was no Board jurisdiction. Plaintiff reasoned that since it had demonstrated in its prior motion that it was entitled to summary judgment, defendant was responsible for payment of plaintiff’s claims for assigned no-fault benefits.

In an order entered May 6, 2015, from which plaintiff appeals, the Civil Court (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross [*2]motion for leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

A motion for leave to renew “shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination” (CPLR 2221 [e] [2]) and must “contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion” (CPLR 2221 [e] [3]). We note that a claim for workers’ compensation benefits must be filed by the injured worker on a particular Board form within two years after the date of the accident (Workers’ Compensation Law § 28) and may not be assigned (Workers’ Compensation Law § 33). Plaintiff did not demonstrate that its assignor had made a proper application for workers’ compensation benefits (see A. B. Med. Servs., PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 141[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50076[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]). Since it cannot be said that the alleged “new facts” offered by plaintiff would have changed the prior determination, and since plaintiff did not show good cause why the complaint should not be dismissed, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to renew and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Elliot, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Decided on January 20, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS