Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51979(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51979(U))

[*1]

Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co.

2025 NY Slip Op 51979(U)

Decided on December 5, 2025

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 5, 2025

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1133 RI C

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.

For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51980(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51980(U))

[*1]

Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co.

2025 NY Slip Op 51980(U)

Decided on December 5, 2025

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected in part through December 17, 2025; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 5, 2025

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1134 RI C

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek (Kenneth F. Popper of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.

For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025Pyramid Care, P.T., P.C. v Safe Auto Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51981(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Pyramid Care, P.T., P.C. v Safe Auto Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51981(U))

[*1]

Pyramid Care, P.T., P.C. v Safe Auto Ins. Co.

2025 NY Slip Op 51981(U)

Decided on December 5, 2025

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 5, 2025

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1165 K C

Alahverdian Van Leuvan, P.C. (Gerard Van Leuvan of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lola Waterman, J.), entered May 21, 2024. The order denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. In support of its motion, defendant argued that the Civil Court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over it because it is an Ohio company which is not authorized to do business in New York, and that it has not filed a statement with the Superintendent of Insurance agreeing that its automobile insurance policies will be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law; that the $5,000 limit of the insurance policy had been exhausted prior to plaintiff’s claims; and that it was not properly served with the summons and complaint. By order entered May 21, 2024, the Civil Court (Lola Waterman, J.) solely addressed, and denied, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). The court found that defendant “failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form.” Specifically, the affidavit by defendant’s director of claims, which was signed and notarized in Ohio, lacked a certificate of conformity, and the insurance policy’s declaration page was not certified and lacked any foundation. The order concluded by noting that “issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York,” and that “This case shall proceed on to trial on the issue of personal jurisdiction.” On appeal, defendant contends that the Civil Court should have granted the branch of its motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to its determination that there were various deficiencies in defendant’s submissions which required its motion to be denied, the court found that sufficient issues of fact existed “as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York” and, therefore, held that the issue of personal jurisdiction would be determined at trial. We find that this determination by the Civil Court was proper under the circumstances of this case.

Defendant’s remaining contentions either lack merit or are unpreserved for appellate review.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025GC Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51982(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at GC Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51982(U))

[*1]

GC Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

2025 NY Slip Op 51982(U)

Decided on December 5, 2025

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 5, 2025

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1169 K C

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak, David Paul Horowitz and Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.), dated May 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, adhered to a prior determination of that court in an order dated October 18, 2022 denying the motion.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and, upon renewal, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). As relevant here, by order dated October 18, 2022, the Civil Court (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.) found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and denials, but denied defendant summary judgment, finding that the affirmation of defendant’s attorney attesting to plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs was insufficient due to the “significant lapse in time” between the alleged no-shows and execution of the affirmation.

Defendant subsequently moved for leave to renew its motion, arguing that, under SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO (76 Misc 3d 134[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]), defendant’s attorney’s affirmation was sufficient to demonstrate plaintiff’s failure to appear. Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.) dated May 15, 2024 as, upon granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to renew, adhered to its prior determination denying defendant’s [*2]motion for summary judgment, finding that the attorney’s affirmation was “on its face unworthy of belief” as it was executed approximately three years after the purported EUO no-shows.

Contrary to the finding of the Civil Court, defendant’s attorney’s affirmation, “on its face, . . . was not unworthy of belief” (SVP Med Supply, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U], *2; see Brefni Chiropractic Diagnostics, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 Misc 3d 128[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51518[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; MAZ Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50492[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), and was sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled EUOs (see SVP Med Supply, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U], *1-2; see also Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [2015]; Brefni Chiropractic Diagnostics, P.C., 2025 NY Slip Op 51518[U]; MAZ Chiropractic, P.C., 2025 NY Slip Op 50492[U]; T & J Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Misc 3d 130[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50406[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 141[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51310[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

To the extent that plaintiff purports to challenge on appeal the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, such challenge lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and, upon renewal, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025Harvey Family Chiropractic, Physical Therapy & Acupuncture, PLLC v MVAIC (2025 NY Slip Op 51971(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Harvey Family Chiropractic, Physical Therapy & Acupuncture, PLLC v MVAIC (2025 NY Slip Op 51971(U))

[*1]

Harvey Family Chiropractic, Physical Therapy & Acupuncture, PLLC v MVAIC

2025 NY Slip Op 51971(U) [87 Misc 3d 134(A)]

Decided on December 5, 2025

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 5, 2025

PRESENT: : LISA S. OTTLEY, J.P., WAVNY TOUSSAINT, MARINA CORA MUNDY, JJ
2024-500 K C

Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and David Gierasch of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Christopher McCollum (Christopher McCollum of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered October 31, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established timely submission of the claims at issue.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) entered October 31, 2023 as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established timely submission of the claims at issue.

“The filing of a timely affidavit providing the MVAIC with notice of intention to file a claim is a condition precedent to the right to apply for payment from [MVAIC]. Compliance with the statutory requirement of timely filing a notice of claim must be established in order to demonstrate that the claimant is a covered person, within the meaning of the statute, entitled to recover no-fault benefits from the MVAIC” (Avicenna Med. Arts, P.L.L.C. v MVAIC, 53 Misc 3d 142[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51535[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Insurance Law §§ 5208 [a] [1], [3]; 5221 [b] [2]). Here, MVAIC failed to establish that it had not received such an affidavit. Thus, MVAIC failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Insurance Law §§ 5202, 5208; cf. Lantsman Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 75 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50568[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).

In addition, the 30-day period within which MVAIC may timely deny a claim or request verification begins to run upon receipt of the claim without regard to whether MVAIC has determined that plaintiff’s assignor is a covered person within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5221 (b) (2) (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 12 AD3d 429 [2004]; Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC, 66 Misc 3d 128[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52045[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). As MVAIC failed to establish that it is not precluded from interposing its defense that plaintiff’s assignor failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath, it was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on that ground.

Defendant also failed to establish, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s claims were improperly billed or were in excess of the amounts permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule.

Finally, in its motion, defendant admits receipt of plaintiff’s claims within 45 days of the dates of service. Accordingly, there is no basis to strike the finding, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff established timely submission of the bills. It is noted that the order does not find that plaintiff established any other element of its prima facie burden at trial (see e.g. Avicenna Med. Arts, P.L.L.C., 2016 NY Slip Op 51535[U]), or otherwise limit the issues for trial.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

OTTLEY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and MUNDY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C. (2025 NY Slip Op 06703)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C. (2025 NY Slip Op 06703)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C.

2025 NY Slip Op 06703

Decided on December 3, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 3, 2025 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
BARRY E. WARHIT
LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.
2024-03961
(Index No. 500128/23)

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY, for appellant.

Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho (Richard) Kang of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated November 1, 2022, Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated July 18, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated June 2, 2023, inter alia, granting that branch of the cross-petition of Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee to the extent of awarding it an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $220, awarded Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of only $220.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding against Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C. (hereinafter Integrated Medicine), pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated November 1, 2022, affirming an arbitration award entered in favor of Integrated Medicine. Integrated Medicine cross-petitioned, among other things, pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee. In an order dated June 2, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted that branch of the cross-petition to the extent of awarding Integrated Medicine an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220. Thereafter, on July 18, 2023, the court, upon the order, issued a judgment, among other things, awarding Integrated Medicine an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220. Integrated Medicine appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to the limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” The recoverable attorney’s fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award, and, in such instances, “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10[j][4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783).

“‘The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court'” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924, quoting [*2]Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839-840). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036; see Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d at 924).

Contrary to the contention of Integrated Medicine, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in awarding Integrated Medicine an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220 without first conducting a hearing (see People’s United Bank v Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 AD3d 689, 691). As an initial matter, since Integrated Medicine failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of its cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see TY Bldrs. II, Inc. v 55 Day Spa, Inc., 167 AD3d 679, 682). Moreover, Integrated Medicine failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) (see Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552, 554). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists'” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9, quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505; see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 860), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding the additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4).

Integrated Medicine’s remaining contentions are either academic or without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WARHIT and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YD Med. Servs., P.C. (2025 NY Slip Op 06704)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YD Med. Servs., P.C. (2025 NY Slip Op 06704)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YD Med. Servs., P.C.

2025 NY Slip Op 06704

Decided on December 3, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 3, 2025 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
BARRY E. WARHIT
LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.
2024-03959
(Index No. 535310/22)

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY, for appellant.

Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho (Richard) Kang of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated September 29, 2022, YD Medical Services, P.C., appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated July 31, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated June 2, 2023, inter alia, granting that branch of the cross-petition of YD Medical Services, P.C., which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee to the extent of awarding it an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $220, awarded YD Medical Services, P.C., an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of only $220.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding against YD Medical Services, P.C. (hereinafter YD Medical), pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated September 29, 2022, affirming an arbitration award entered in favor of YD Medical. YD Medical cross-petitioned, among other things, pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee. In an order dated June 2, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted that branch of the cross-petition to the extent of awarding YD Medical an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220. Thereafter, on July 31, 2023, the court, upon the order, issued a judgment, among other things, awarding YD Medical an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220. YD Medical appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to the limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” The recoverable attorney’s fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award, and, in such instances, “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10[j][4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783).

“‘The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within [*2]the sound discretion of the Supreme Court'” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924, quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839-840). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036; see Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d at 924).

Contrary to the contention of YD Medical, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in awarding YD Medical an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220 without first conducting a hearing (see People’s United Bank v Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 AD3d 689, 691). As an initial matter, since YD Medical failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of its cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see TY Bldrs. II, Inc. v 55 Day Spa, Inc., 167 AD3d 679, 682). Moreover, YD Medical failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) (see Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552, 554). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists'” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9, quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505; see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 860), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding the additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4).

YD Medical’s remaining contentions are either academic or without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WARHIT and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jong Won Yom (2025 NY Slip Op 06705)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jong Won Yom (2025 NY Slip Op 06705)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jong Won Yom

2025 NY Slip Op 06705

Decided on December 3, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 3, 2025 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
BARRY E. WARHIT
LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.
2023-12114
(Index No. 532051/22)

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY, for appellant.

Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho (Richard) Kang of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 26, 2022, Jong Won Yom appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated July 18, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated June 2, 2023, inter alia, granting that branch of the cross-petition of Jong Won Yom which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee to the extent of awarding Jong Won Yom an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $220, awarded Jong Won Yom an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of only $220.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding against Jong Won Yom pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 26, 2022, affirming an arbitration award entered in favor of Yom. Yom cross-petitioned, among other things, pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee. In an order dated June 2, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted that branch of the cross-petition to the extent of awarding Yom an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220. Thereafter, on July 18, 2023, the court, upon the order, issued a judgment, among other things, awarding Yom an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220. Yom appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to the limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” The recoverable attorney’s fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award, and, in such instances, “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10[j][4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783).

“‘The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court'” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924, quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839-840). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036; see Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d at 924).

Contrary to Yom’s contention, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in awarding Yom an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $220 without first conducting a hearing (see People’s United Bank v Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 AD3d 689, 691). As an initial matter, since Yom failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of the cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see TY Bldrs. II, Inc. v 55 Day Spa, Inc., 167 AD3d 679, 682). Moreover, Yom failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) (see Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552, 554). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists'” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9, quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505; see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 860), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding the additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4).

Yom’s remaining contentions are either academic or without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WARHIT and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jong Won Yom (2025 NY Slip Op 06706)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jong Won Yom (2025 NY Slip Op 06706)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jong Won Yom

2025 NY Slip Op 06706

Decided on December 3, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 3, 2025 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
BARRY E. WARHIT
LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.
2024-03958
(Index No. 532032/22)

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY, for appellant.

Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho (Richard) Kang of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 25, 2022, Jong Won Yom appeals from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated July 19, 2023. The amended judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated May 26, 2023, inter alia, granting that branch of the cross-petition of Jong Won Yom which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney’s fee to the extent of awarding Jong Won Yom an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $600, awarded Jong Won Yom an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of only $600.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding against Jong Won Yom pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 25, 2022, affirming an arbitration award entered in favor of Yom. Yom cross-petitioned, among other things, to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorney’s fees. In an order dated May 26, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted that branch of the cross-petition to the extent of awarding Yom an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $600. Thereafter, on July 19, 2023, the court, upon the order, issued an amended judgment, among other things, awarding Yom an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $600. Yom appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to the limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” The recoverable attorney’s fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award, and, in such instances, “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10[j][4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783).

“‘The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court'” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924, quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839-840). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036; see Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d at 924).

Contrary to Yom’s contention, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in awarding Yom an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $600 without first conducting a hearing (see People’s United Bank v Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 AD3d 689, 691). As an initial matter, since Yom failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of the cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see TY Bldrs. II, Inc. v 55 Day Spa, Inc., 167 AD3d 679, 682). Moreover, Yom failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) (see Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552, 554). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists'” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9, quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505; see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 860), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding the additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4).

Yom’s remaining contentions are either academic or without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WARHIT and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Amvrosiatos v Hanover Ins. Group (2025 NY Slip Op 06683)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Amvrosiatos v Hanover Ins. Group (2025 NY Slip Op 06683)

Amvrosiatos v Hanover Ins. Group

2025 NYSlipOp 06683 [244 AD3d 667]

December 3, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, February 4, 2026

[*1]

Angelo Amvrosiatos, Appellant, v Hanover Insurance Group, Respondent.

Elefterakis, Elefterakis & Panek, New York, NY (Oliver R. Tobias of counsel), for appellant.

McCarthy & Associates, Melville, NY (Patrick J. Morale of counsel), for respondent.

Disclosure – Protective Order – Deposition of Insurance Claims Adjuster – Narrowly Tailored, Relevant, and Reasonably Related to Claims

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Phillip Hom, J.), entered October 12, 2023. The order granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order is denied.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when, as a pedestrian, he was struck by a vehicle. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff had automobile insurance pursuant to a policy issued by the defendant, which included a supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM) endorsement. After settling with the tortfeasor driver for the full limit of the driver’s insurance policy with the defendant’s consent, the plaintiff submitted a claim for SUM benefits to the defendant. The defendant denied the claim. The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract. Following the plaintiff’s deposition, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order directing that a representative of the defendant is not obligated to appear for a deposition. The plaintiff opposed. In an order entered October 12, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion. The plaintiff appeals.

“There shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof” (id. § 3101 [a]; see Espinoza v Tejeda, 228 AD3d 623, 624 [2024]). “The words, ‘material and necessary’, are . . . to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason” (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). “It is incumbent on the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the method of discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims, and unsubstantiated bare allegations of relevancy are insufficient to establish the factual predicate regarding relevancy” (Whitnum v Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery, P.C., 142 AD3d 495, 496 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

“An insurance carrier has a duty to ‘investigate in good faith and pay covered claims’ ” (Gutierrez v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 136 AD3d 975, 976 [2016], quoting Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d 187, 195 [2008]). “The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a pledge that neither party to the contract shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruit of the contract, even if the terms of the contract do not explicitly prohibit such conduct” (id.).

Here, the plaintiff contends that the deposition of the claims adjuster who investigated the plaintiff’s claims would reveal evidence regarding the nature, extent, timing, and adequacy of the defendant’s investigation. Thus, the plaintiff sufficiently asserted that deposing the claims adjuster may result in the disclosure of relevant evidence and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the plaintiff’s claims (see Smith-Percival v MTA Bus Co., 232 AD3d 928, 929-930 [2024]).

Further, the plaintiff’s request for a deposition was not “palpably improper” because the plaintiff narrowly tailored his deposition request to a specific employee regarding a specific investigation, concerning specific claims against the defendant (Ural v Encompass Ins. Co. of Am., 158 AD3d 845, 847 [2018]). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order should have been denied.

The plaintiff’s remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination. Connolly, J.P., Ford, Voutsinas and Landicino, JJ., concur.