Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-1087 K C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Maryana Feigen, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered December 29, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument on appeal, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, since the proof it submitted failed to establish that the claims at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-1076 K C

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Douglas Mace, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Kenneth F. Popper, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered January 12, 2015. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the proof submitted by defendant was sufficient to establish the proper mailing of the denial of claim forms at issue (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Plaintiff’s remaining contention lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-1063 K C

Gullo & Associates, LLP (Natalie Socorro, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Emilia I. Rutigliano, P.C. (Marina Josovich, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered January 23, 2015. The judgment, entered pursuant to an order of that court entered December 29, 2014 denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,353.

ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the order entered December 29, 2014 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment entered January 23, 2015 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order entered December 29, 2014 is vacated, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide verification which defendant had requested. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. Defendant appeals from an order entered December 29, 2014, in which the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion, finding that defendant was precluded from raising its defense that verification had not been provided because defendant had not timely denied plaintiff’s claims [*2]on that ground, and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. We deem the notice of appeal from the order entered December 29, 2014 to be a premature notice of appeal from a judgment which was subsequently entered on January 23, 2015 in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $2,353 (see CPLR 5520 [c]).

For the reasons stated in Irina Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Zhane Darqan v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (__ Misc 3d ___, 2017 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2015-1018 K C], decided herewith), the judgment is reversed, the order entered December 29, 2014 is vacated, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-1018 K C

Gullo & Associates, LLP (Natalie Socorro, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Emilia I. Rutigliano (Marina Josovich, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered January 23, 2015. The judgment, entered pursuant to an order of that court entered December 29, 2014 denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,673.11.

ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the order entered December 29, 2014 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment entered January 23, 2015 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order entered December 29, 2014 is vacated, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide verification which defendant had requested. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. Defendant appeals from an order entered December 29, 2014, in which the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion, finding that defendant was precluded from raising its defense that verification had not been provided because defendant had not timely denied plaintiff’s claims [*2]on that ground, and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. We deem the notice of appeal from the order entered December 29, 2014 to be a premature notice of appeal from a judgment which was subsequently entered on January 23, 2015 in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $2,673.11 (see CPLR 5520 [c]).

Defendant demonstrated that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) and that it had not received the requested verification. Thus, defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the complaint is premature (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492, 493 [2005]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion, the motion should have been granted and plaintiff’s cross motion should have been denied.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered December 29, 2014 is vacated, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-1013 Q C

Korsunskiy Legal Group, P.C. (Henry R. Guindi, Esq.), for appellant. The Law Office of Printz & Goldstein (Lawrence J. Chanice, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Cheree A. Buggs, J.), entered January 22, 2015. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Civil Court which, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

The issue at trial was whether the services in question were medically necessary. The Civil Court accepted defendant’s expert witness’s testimony and found that defendant had satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the services were not medically necessary (see Dayan v Allstate Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 151[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51751[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). It was then plaintiff’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the services rendered were medically necessary (see Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co., 37 Misc 3d 19, 22 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to meet that burden. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the Civil Court’s limitation of its cross-examination of defendant’s expert witness are without merit (see Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636 [1980]).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-859 Q C

Gullo & Associates, LLP (Natalie Socorro, Esq.), for appellant. Mandell & Santora (Michael J. Rago, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Cheree A. Buggs, J.), entered March 12, 2015. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the Civil Court’s determination that there is a triable issue of fact regarding the medical necessity of the services at issue (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-667 Q C

Law Offices of Moira Doherty (Lisa Taranto-Fernandez, Esq.), for appellant. The Beynenson Law Firm, P.C. (Alek Beynenson, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered February 27, 2015. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the Civil Court’s determination that there is a triable issue of fact regarding the medical necessity of the services at issue (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-624 Q C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. The Law Office of Printz & Goldstein (Lawrence J. Chanice, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered February 4, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims which had been denied based on the workers’ compensation fee schedule, and, upon denying the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the complaint, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely denials of the claims underlying that portion of the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims which had been denied based on the workers’ compensation fee schedule, and, upon denying the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the complaint, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely denials of the claims underlying that portion of the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, defendant’s proof established the proper mailing of the [*2]denial of claim forms at issue (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Plaintiff’s further argument regarding defendant’s application of the workers’ compensation fee schedule also lacks merit (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-608 Q C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Maryana Feigen, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered February 11, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed under CPT codes 97010, 97110 and 97124.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed under CPT codes 97010, 97110 and 97124 are denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed under CPT codes 97010, 97110 and 97124.

Plaintiff properly argues on appeal that defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, its defense that the fees charged with respect to the services billed under codes CPT 97010, 97110 and 97124 exceeded the amounts set forth in the workers’ compensation fee schedule therefor (see Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Defendant failed to demonstrate that it had used the correct conversion factor in calculating the reimbursement rate. [*2]Consequently, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for those services should have been denied.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed under CPT codes 97010, 97110 and 97124 are denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-516 Q C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered February 5, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on the third through tenth causes of action and granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third through tenth causes of action are denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order as denied the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on the third through tenth causes of action and granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action.

With respect to the third cause of action, plaintiff correctly argues that defendant failed to establish its defense that the fees charged exceeded the amounts set forth in the workers’ compensation fee schedule (see Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Therefore, [*2]defendant is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action.

With respect to the fourth through tenth causes of action, plaintiff correctly argues that defendant failed to establish that the initial and follow-up letters scheduling independent medical examinations (IMEs) had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). As a result, defendant failed to demonstrate that the IMEs had been properly scheduled and, thus, that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 722 [2006]). Consequently, defendant is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the fourth through tenth causes of action.

However, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on these causes of action, as plaintiff failed to establish that the claims at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denials of these claims that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third through tenth causes of action are denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.