Decided on June 28, 2018

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Karina Barska of counsel), for appellant. Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Eric M. Wahrburg of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered July 8, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for services it had provided to its assignor, who had purportedly been injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 6, 2012. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, based upon prior orders of the Civil Court, Queens County, entered in two separate actions and on the further ground that defendant did not have a policy of insurance which covered plaintiff’s assignor on the date of the accident. Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order entered July 8, 2016, the Civil Court granted the motion, finding that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from proceeding in this action, and the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

In support of its motion, defendant annexed the prior orders of the Civil Court, Queens County, which stated, insofar as is relevant, that defendant had established that there was no coverage “at the time of the accident in question, as the policy was cancelled for nonpayment effective 2/28/12.” Although defendant’s attorney asserted in an affirmation in support of the [*2]motion at bar that the “orders were rendered on motions that contained almost identical facts and evidence as presented herein,” neither order stated the date of the accident at issue before that court, and defendant did not annex the respective complaints or underlying motion papers. We also note that the present plaintiff, Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC, was not a party to either of the Civil Court, Queens County, actions, as those actions had been commenced by Island Life Chiropractic, P.C. and Tam Medical Supply Corp., respectively.

A party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must demonstrate “that the particular issue was actually litigated, squarely addressed, and specifically decided in a prior proceeding” (M. Kaminsky & M. Friedberger v Wilson, 150 AD3d 1094, 1095 [2017]; see D’Arata v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659 [1990]). In the case at bar, defendant’s submission in support of its motion for summary judgment of copies of the two orders of the Civil Court, without more, was, under the circumstances presented, insufficient to show that plaintiff was attempting to relitigate the same issue which had been raised in the prior actions (see Triboro Quality Med. Supply, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 131[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51289[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). Consequently, defendant failed to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Defendant also argued that, even if the court did not find that defendant had established its lack of coverage defense through collateral estoppel, the evidence it submitted in support of its present motion was, in any event, sufficient to establish the defense. To establish a lack of coverage, defendant was required to demonstrate that the applicable policy had been validly cancelled (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Misc 3d 138[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51216[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; see generally Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. v Infinity Group, 50 Misc 3d 144[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50257[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). However, defendant failed to prove the mailing of a cancellation letter in accordance with New York law (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 [1] [a]) or, contrary to what defendant asserted for the first time in a reply affirmation in the Civil Court, in accordance with Connecticut law (see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-343 [a]). Consequently, defendant failed to demonstrate that the insurance policy had been validly cancelled.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (David Landfair of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Printz & Goldstein (Lawrence J. Chanice of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), entered October 17, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant established that the denial of claim form, which had denied the claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity, had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Defendant further submitted an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the neurologist’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant’s prima facie showing was not rebutted by plaintiff.

Upon the record presented, we find no merit to plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s cross motion should have been denied, or a continuance ordered to provide an opportunity for disclosure, as plaintiff had ample opportunity to take steps to compel discovery or otherwise investigate the case before it moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff failed to do so, and its inaction may not now be used as a means to defeat defendant’s cross motion (see Edwards v Terryville Meat Co., 178 AD2d 580 [1991]; Silinsky v State-Wide Ins. Co., 30 AD2d 1 [1968]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.

Decided on June 18, 2018

21843/2017E

Counsel for Plaintiff: Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.)

Counsel for Defendant: Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (David Landfair, Esq.)

The following papers numbered 1 to 6 ere read on this motion (Seq. No. __ )

Answering Affidavit and Exhibits No(s). 3, 4

Replying Affidavit and Exhibits No(s). 5, 6

Upon the foregoing papers, the plaintiff Global Liberty Insurance Company of New York (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order (1) granting Plaintiff summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 against Prompt Medical Supply, Inc. (“Prompt”), ordering, adjudging, and decreeing that Prompt is not entitled to no-fault coverage for the motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 24, 2015, since defendant Rosalee Otero (“Otero”) failed to attend properly scheduled IME’s, and (2) permanently staying all Civil Court matters and no-fault arbitrations. Prompt opposes the motion.

Plaintiff provided a policy of insurance to its insured which included a no-fault endorsement providing coverage to an insured, or an eligible injured person, in an amount of at least $50,000 for all necessary expenses resulting from a motor vehicle accident. This policy was in effect on August 24, 2015. On that date, Otero was allegedly involved in a motor vehicle accident and she thereafter made claims as an eligible person under the above-referenced insurance policy. Otero specifically sought no-fault benefits from the named provider defendants, including Prompt. Otero assigned her rights to collect no-fault benefits to the provider defendants, who thereafter submitted no-fault billing to Plaintiff for the services they rendered to Otero.

On October 13, 2015, OmniMed Evaluation Services (“OmniMed”), on behalf of Plaintiff, sent Otero a letter requesting that she attend a chiropractor/acupuncture independent medical examination (“IME”) scheduled for October 26, 2015. Otero failed to appear for the duly scheduled IME. On October 26, 2015, OmniMed sent Otero a second letter requesting that she attend a chiropractor/acupuncture IME on November 9, 2015. Again, Otero failed to attend the duly scheduled IME. Plaintiff states that the first no-fault billing on this case was received from the answering defendant on October 13, 2015. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this declaratory judgment action and now moves for summary judgment.

Under New York Code of Rules and Regulations 11 (“NYCRR”), §65-1.1, the failure to appear for IMEs requested by the insurer “when, and as often as, [it] may reasonable require” is a breach of a condition precedent to coverage under a No-Fault policy. Accordingly, when the [*2]defendants’ assignor Otero failed to appear for the requested IMEs, Plaintiff had the right to deny all claims retroactively to the date of loss (see 11 NYCRR §65-3.8[c]). Otero’s non-appearance at the IMEs constitutes a failure of a condition precedent to receipt of insurance benefits for the motor vehicle accident, to any parties potentially entitled to benefits under Insurance Law §5103 or their assignees (11 NYCRR §65-1.1(a). See NY Ins. Law §5103[d] and [h]; Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v. Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept. 2011], lv. den., 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; Mapfire Ins. Co. of NY v. Manoo, 140 AD3d 468 [1st Dept. 2016]). Plaintiff’s submissions established its entitlement to summary judgment, as it provided evidence that it sent notices scheduling Otero’s IME examination on two occasions, and Otero failed to appear. Plaintiff also provided sufficient evidence that it complied with the procedures and time frames set forth in the no-fault implementing regulations (Unitrin, 82 AD3d at 560]). Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated that it is entitled to disclaim coverage to an eligible insured and to his or her assignees, retroactive to the date of loss.

In opposition to the motion, Prompt first asserts that the affidavits from Regina Abbatiello and Karin Bruford are not in admissible form. Prompt alleges that the affidavits failed to adequately show that the affiants proved their identities to the notary. However, the notary on both affidavits contains the language “sworn to before me” on a date certain. A notary public is “presumed to have acted within his or her jurisdiction and carried out his or her duties as required by law” where, as here, there is no showing to the contrary (see Collins v. AA Truck Renting Corp., 209 AD2d 363 [1st Dept. 1994]). Prompt also asserts that the captions on two of the affidavits are incorrect. However Prompt does not claim to have sustained any prejudice as a result of this error, and it was able to provide substantive opposition to this motion. “Defects, mistakes, and irregularities” may be ignored where, as here, there is no showing of prejudice (see First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Hakiman, 237 AD2d 249, 249 [2nd Dept. 1997]).

Prompt next argues that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it properly scheduled the IME within 30 days of receipt of billing in accordance with 11 NYCRR §65-3.5(d). This contention is unavailing. Plaintiff has supplied an affidavit from Regina Abbatiello, a no-fault claims examiner, who stated that she has personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s office procedures and processing of no-fault claims. She asserts that, in this case, the first no-fault billing was received from the answering defendant on October 13, 2015. The first IME was scheduled for October 26, 2015, within 30 days of receipt of that billing. Contrary to Prompt’s contentions, these sworn assertions are sufficient to demonstrate Plaintiff’s compliance with the statute (compare American Transit Inc. Co. v. Longevity Med. Supply, Inc., 131 AD3d 841, 842 [1st Dept. 2015][plaintiff failed to establish that it complied with 30-day requirement where it provided “no evidence in affidavit form or any other form” indicating the date upon which plaintiff received the prescribed verification form from defendant]). Prompt failed to submit any admissible evidence refuting the allegations in the Abbatiello affidavit.

Prompt contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish the proper mailing of the IME scheduling letters. Prompt alleges that the affidavit from Karin Bruford of OmniMed is insufficient because she fails to allege that she had personal knowledge of the standard used to mail scheduling letters, and she fails to provide substantive information regarding how mailing addresses are verified or how postage is affixed to mailings, or how Plaintiff delivers mail into the custody of USPS.

After review of the challenged affidavit and accompanying submissions, this Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently carried its burden of proof. It order to raise the presumption of proper mailing, a movant may either provide “proof of actual mailing or proof of a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” (see American Transit Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 111 AD3d 423, 424 [1st Dept. 2013], citing Residential Holding Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679, 680 [2nd Dept. 2001]). In this case, the Bruford affidavit competently explains the office procedure for affixing postage and states that clerical staff in her office transfer mail to the exclusive possession of the United States Postal [*3]Service. She affirms that the IME letters in this case were sent to Otero’s address, which was 230 New Lots Ave., 6D, Brooklyn, New York 11207. Plaintiff has also supplied mailing ledgers date-stamped and signed by a United States Postal Service employee. Each of these ledgers indicates that mailings were sent to Otero and her attorney’s office. This evidence, when considered alongside the Bruford affidavit, sufficiently carried Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that the IME letters were properly mailed (see American Transit Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 111 AD3d 423, 424; Residential Holding Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679, 680 [testimony, certificate of mailing, and signed and stamped mailing ledger provided proof of actual mailing]). Furthermore, the foregoing evidence establishes that the mailings were sent to Otero’s proper address. While Plaintiff’s counsel and Abbattiello state that Otero’s address was “230 Lotts Avenue, Apt. 4D, Brooklyn, NY 11207,” Otero’s application for no-fault benefits sent to Plaintiff lists her address as “230 New Lots Avenue, Apt. 6D, Brooklyn, NY 11207” which is the address the mailings were sent to. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was ever made aware of the different address that Otero provided to Prompt in her assignment of benefits form, which post-dates the date of the two mailings.

Finally, Prompt contends that the affidavit from Plaintiff’s IME physician is insufficient to establish that Otero failed to appear for duly-scheduled appointments. This Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s physician Dr. Antionette Perrie states that she was personally present at her office on the IME dates, but the claimant failed to appear. The doctor notes that it was her office’s practice to note a claimant’s non-appearance, and she can say with certainty that claimant failed to appear on the appointment dates. The foregoing contentions are sufficient to establish the basis for the doctor’s personal knowledge that claimant-Otero failed to appear for duly-scheduled IME appointments (see American Transit Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 111 AD3d 423, 424 [1st Dept. 2013]). The physician affidavit is substantially similar to the one presented in support of a motion for summary judgment in American Transit Ins. Co. v. Clark, New York County Index No. 152876/2012 (see Ronald G. Lafranchi Affidavit dated April 7, 2013; Exhibit 4 to plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment/summary judgment). On appeal, while the First Department determined that the plaintiff’s motion should have been denied on other grounds, the Court did find that the plaintiff had adequately established that the claimant failed to appear for duly-scheduled IME’s (131 AD3d 840 [1st Dept. 2015]). Furthermore, in American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Solorzano, the plaintiff’s IME doctor submitted an affidavit that only stated, in pertinent part, “[claimant] was scheduled to appear for a Medical Examination on Monday, February 28, 2011 and Monday, March 14, 2011 pursuant to requests made by Independent Physical Exam Referrals, Inc. The claimant failed to comply with the requests and did not appear on those dates” (see Dr. Cirino G. Sesto Affidavit, dated May 9, 2011; Exhibit 4 to plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment/summary judgment; Bronx County Index No. 307769/2011). The First Department found that this affidavit, along with plaintiff’s other submissions, was sufficient to demonstrate that the claimant failed to appear for duly scheduled IME’s (108 AD3d 449 [1st Dept. 2013). In this case, this Court similarly finds that the affidavits of Plaintiff’s IME physician and from Ms. Bruford are sufficient to demonstrate that claimant Otero failed to appear for her scheduled IMEs.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Prompt is granted, and it is further,

ORDERED and DECLARED, that Prompt is not entitled to no-fault coverage for the subject motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 24, 2015, since claimant Otero failed to attend properly scheduled IMEs, and it is further,

ORDERED, that any related Civil Court matters and no-fault arbitrations are permanently stayed.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: June 15, 2018

[*4]Hon.___________

J.S.C.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Karina Barska of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered August 11, 2016. The order denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), on the ground that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. In several affidavits in support of the motion, defendant’s employees asserted that defendant is a Pennsylvania company, which is not licensed to do business in New York, maintains no offices in New York, has no agents operating out of, or representatives soliciting business in, New York, and does not own, use or possess any real property in New York. Furthermore, defendant argued that it had been held in prior cases that the courts in the State of New York cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over this defendant. Plaintiff opposed the motion with an affirmation by its counsel, who made unsupported assertions that defendant had transacted business in New York by knowingly issuing policies to New York drivers, and that defendant had established an ongoing relationship with defense counsel in New York, thereby subjecting defendant to jurisdiction in New York. Defendant’s attorney asserted in a reply affirmation that the arguments raised by plaintiff had been rejected by this court in Compas Med., P.C. v American Ind. Ins. Co. (47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50481[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered August 11, 2016 denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Defendant made a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction had not been obtained over it. “In opposing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, ‘a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that such jurisdiction exists’ ” (Hopstein v Cohen, 143 AD3d 859, 860 [2016], quoting Lang v Wycoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., [*2]55 AD3d 793, 798 [2008]). In the case at bar, the affirmation of plaintiff’s attorney was insufficient to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction over defendant existed under the Civil Court’s long-arm statute (see CCA 404 [a]), as plaintiff’s counsel failed to establish that he possessed personal knowledge of the facts.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Jessica Voto of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Joseph Esposito, J.), entered June 3, 2015, deemed from a judgment of that court entered May 6, 2016 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the June 3, 2015 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $934.15.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s motion is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, among other things, that defendant had timely denied the claim on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor’s intoxication at the time of the accident at issue was the proximate cause of the accident. By order entered June 3, 2015, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion. Defendant’s appeal from the June 3, 2015 order is deemed from a judgment that was entered on May 6, 2016 pursuant to the order (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether it had timely and properly denied the claim based on the alleged intoxication of plaintiff’s assignor, who was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident at issue (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Mapfre Ins. Co. of NY, 119 AD3d 777 [2014]; NYU-Hospital for Joint Diseases v Esurance Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1190 [2011]).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion is denied.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Offices of Daniel J. Tucker (Daniel J. Tucker and Netanel BenChaim of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Damin J. Toell, P.C. (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered October 23, 2015. The order (1) denied defendant’s motion for an order staying the action pending a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law and, in the event that plaintiff fails to file proof of such an application to the Workers’ Compensation Board with the court within 90 days of the date of the court’s order, granting defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s motion is granted to the extent that the matter shall be held in abeyance pending a prompt application to the Workers’ Compensation Board for a determination of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law, and, in the event that plaintiff fails to file proof with the Civil Court of such application within 90 days of the date of this decision and order, the Civil Court shall grant defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint and deny plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment unless plaintiff shows good cause why the complaint should not be dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for an order staying the action pending a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law and, in the event plaintiff fails to file proof of such an application to the Workers’ Compensation Board with the court within 90 days of the date of the court’s order, granting defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s assignor had been injured during the course of his employment. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered October 23, 2015, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and granted plaintiff’s cross motion.

Defendant proffered sufficient evidence to support its contention that there was an issue as to whether plaintiff’s assignor had been acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident and that, therefore, workers’ compensation benefits might be available (see e.g. Arce [*2]Med. & Diagnostic Svce v American Tr. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 134[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50531[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; cf. Westchester Med. Ctr. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 848 [2009]). “Since primary jurisdiction with respect to determination as to the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Law has been vested in the Workers’ Compensation Board, ‘it is inappropriate for the courts to express views with respect thereto pending determination by the board’ ” (Monteiro v Rasraj Foods & Catering, Inc., 79 AD3d 827, 829 [2010], quoting Botwinick v Ogden, 59 NY2d 909, 911 [1983]). This issue must be resolved in the first instance by the Workers’ Compensation Board (see O’Rourke v Long, 41 NY2d 219 [1976]; Siekkeli v Mark Mariani, Inc., 119 AD3d 766 [2014]; Dunn v American Tr. Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 629, 629-630 [2010]; Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U]; D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U]).

Plaintiff’s argument that it believes that Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 renders any claim for workers’ compensation benefits untimely in this case—because plaintiff’s assignor did not make an application for benefits within two years of the date of the accident—is unavailing, particularly where, as here, defendant demonstrated, and plaintiff did not deny, that defendant had timely denied plaintiff’s claim on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor was injured during the course of his employment.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant’s motion is granted to the extent that the matter shall be held in abeyance pending a prompt application to the Workers’ Compensation Board for a determination of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law, and, in the event that plaintiff fails to file proof with the Civil Court of such application within 90 days of the date of this decision and order, the Civil Court shall grant defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint and deny plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment unless plaintiff shows good cause why the complaint should not be dismissed.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

[*1]

Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Gail S. Lauzon (Russo & Tambasco, Melville, NY [Susan J. Mitola], of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an arbitration award, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas D. Raffaele, J.), dated January 22, 2016. The order denied the petition pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the arbitration award.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On August 6, 2012, a vehicle owned and operated by the petitioner was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned and operated by Omau Kwende Channer. Both vehicles were insured by the respondent, GEICO Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO). Following the accident, the petitioner commenced an action against Channer to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. She obtained summary judgment in her favor on the issue of liability, after which GEICO settled that action for the sum of $25,000, which was the full limit on the insurance policy held by Channer. Thereafter, the petitioner made a claim, under her own policy with GEICO, for supplemental underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM) benefits in the amount of $275,000. GEICO denied the SUM claim, arguing that the injury for which the petitioner sought SUM compensation (hereinafter the subject injury) was not the result of the motor vehicle accident. In response, the petitioner made a demand for arbitration.

A SUM arbitration hearing was held on January 23, 2015, and the parties submitted, inter alia, the petitioner’s medical records and independent medical examination and peer review reports commissioned by GEICO. In an award dated March 2, 2015, the arbitrator concluded that the subject injury was not the result of the motor vehicle accident, and therefore denied the petitioner’s SUM claim. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate the SUM arbitration award. She argued that the award was arbitrary and capricious, irrational, and that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by failing to preclude GEICO from disputing causation since GEICO had taken a prior inconsistent position on that issue by paying no-fault benefits related to the subject injury. By order dated January 22, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the petition. The petitioner appeals.

Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited (see Matter of County of Nassau v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., 150 AD3d 1230, 1230 [2017]; Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d 40, 45 [2015]). Pursuant to CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (iii), a court may [*2]vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator “exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” However, vacatur of an award pursuant to this provision is warranted “ ’only if it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power’ ” (Matter of Vintage Flooring & Tile, Inc. v DCM of NY, LLC, 123 AD3d 731, 732 [2014], quoting Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]; see Matter of Peterson v Katonah-Lewisboro UFSD, 134 AD3d 1125, 1125 [2015]). “ ’An award is irrational when there is no proof whatever to justify the award’ ” (Matter of Peterson v Katonah-Lewisboro UFSD, 134 AD3d at 1125, quoting Matter of Vintage Flooring & Tile, Inc. v DCM of NY, LLC, 123 AD3d at 732; see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 534).

Where, as here, an arbitration award is the product of compulsory arbitration, the award “ ’must satisfy an additional layer of judicial scrutiny—it must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious’ ” (Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 144 AD3d 1160, 1161 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 919 [2011]; see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 223 [1996]; Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d at 46).

Here, the arbitrator’s determination was rational, supported by evidence, and not arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, while the petitioner contends that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by disregarding GEICO’s prior inconsistent position, taken in the no-fault context, the alleged error was, at most, an error of law which would not warrant vacatur of the arbitration award (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 534).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Rivera, Hinds-Radix and Iannacci, JJ., concur.

Decided on June 8, 2018

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS