Rossillo & Licata, P.C. (Nancy S. Linden of counsel), for appellant. Korsunskiy Legal Group, P.C. (Henry R. Guindi and Melissa Berkman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered January 16, 2015, deemed from a judgment of that court entered March 9, 2015 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the January 16, 2015 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,916.46.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered January 16, 2015, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and granted plaintiff’s cross motion. This appeal by defendant ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered on March 9, 2015, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65—3.6 (b), upon sending a second examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letter to plaintiff’s assignor, defendant was required to send plaintiff a delay letter (see Doshi Diagnostic Imaging Servs. v State Farm Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 42 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dist 2007]; see also Advantage Radiology, P.C. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 91 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). However, it failed to do so. Consequently, defendant failed to demonstrate that it had properly tolled the time to pay or deny plaintiff’s claims and, as a result, it is precluded from raising its proferred defense that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled EUOs (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

WESTON, J.P., PESCE and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jonathan Depasquale, Jason Tenenbaum and Talia Beard of counsel), for appellant. Baker Sanders, LLC, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fourth District (James F. Matthews, J.), dated July 6, 2017. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that the action was premature inasmuch as the time in which defendant had to pay or deny plaintiff’s claims had been tolled because plaintiff had failed to respond to timely requests for verification. By order dated July 6, 2017, the District Court denied the motion.

Contrary to the determination of the District Court, defendant established the timely mailing of the initial and follow-up verification requests (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). As defendant also sufficiently established that it had not received the requested verification, and plaintiff did not show that the verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of the action, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims did not begin to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [c]; 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]), and, thus, plaintiff’s action is premature.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

GARGUILO, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered September 16, 2014. The order denied defendant’s motion to sever so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Lucila Hernandez from the remaining claims.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

The complaint in this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits seeks to recover for services that had been rendered to three assignors. Defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 603, to sever so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Lucila Hernandez from the remaining claims, which sought to recover upon claims for services rendered to Shifro Khaimova and Robin Khaimova. Defendant’s counsel asserted that the claims had arisen out of two different accidents and that multiple defenses had been interposed in the answer. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

The decision to grant severance (see CPLR 603) is an exercise of judicial discretion which, in the absence of a party’s showing of prejudice to a substantial right, should not be disturbed on appeal (see King’s Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50232[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In the instant matter, while the assignors were injured in separate accidents and defendant interposed 50 [*2]defenses in its answer, these two facts, standing alone, do not demonstrate that resolution of the claims for services rendered to plaintiff’s assignors will involve different questions of fact and law. As such, the record does not establish that the Civil Court’s denial of defendant’s motion was an improvident exercise of discretion.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. De Martini & Yi, LLP (Bryan Visnius of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered May 10, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had never received the claim underlying the first cause of action and that it had timely and properly denied the claim underlying the second cause of action based upon plaintiff’s failure to provide requested verification within 120 days of the initial verification request (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [o]), and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff correctly argues, in effect, that the proof submitted in support of its cross motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that plaintiff had timely mailed the claim underlying the first cause of action (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the claim underlying the first cause of action was timely submitted.

Contrary to plaintiff’s further contentions, defendant’s proof was sufficient to [*2]demonstrate, prima facie, that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up verification requests as to the claim underlying the second cause of action (see id.); that it had not received the requested verification; and that it had timely denied the claim on that ground (see id.). However, as plaintiff further argues, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its cross motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see id.). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff provided the requested verification as to the second cause of action.

In view of the triable issues of fact, plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (John J. Kelley, J.), entered May 3, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant sufficiently established plaintiff’s failure to appear for two scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Theresa M. Ciccotto, J.), entered March 16, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant sufficiently established plaintiff’s failure to appear for two scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court, as this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]), and we decline to consider it.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rubin & Nazarian (Michael Tomforde of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered March 16, 2016. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant did not provide insurance coverage for the vehicle in question on the date of the accident at issue.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted affidavits by three employees who described the details of record searches they had performed and stated that their searches had revealed that there was no relevant Hereford Insurance Company policy in effect on the date of the accident in question. We find that defendant’s affidavits were sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of a covered incident (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.