Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant. Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Douglas Mace of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered June 9, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). By order entered June 9, 2016, the Civil Court denied the motion, but found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. The Civil Court further found that the only remaining issues for trial were plaintiff’s prima facie case and “an issue of fact regarding the discrepancy between the person stated to be the contact for defense counsel in the EUO request letters and the person signing the affidavit regarding plaintiff’s failure to appear.” Defendant appeals, contending that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

To establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a complaint on the ground that a provider had failed to appear for an EUO, an insurer must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had twice duly demanded an EUO from the provider, that the provider had twice failed to appear, and that the insurer had issued a timely denial of the claims (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014]; Integrative Pain Medicine, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 53 Misc 3d 140[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51520[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th [*2]Jud Dists 2016]). Plaintiff challenges the Civil Court’s implicit CPLR 3212 (g) findings in favor of defendant. However, a review of the record establishes that the Civil Court correctly determined that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. As a result, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We note that an EUO request letter which lists a contact at defendant’s law firm which is different from the attorney at the same law firm signing the otherwise sufficient affirmation of nonappearance of plaintiff at the duly scheduled EUO does not raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Decided on March 1, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. De Martini & Yi, LLP (Bryan Visnius of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered May 9, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover $54.73 for an initial visit on February 5, 2014 and an additional $.63 for services rendered on February 27, 2014 are denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule.

Plaintiff argues that defendant failed to establish that defendant’s fee reductions, which had been done in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors, were proper. However, this court has held, “as a matter of law, that an insurer may use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which a licensed acupuncturist is entitled to receive for such acupuncture services” (Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23, 24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Nevertheless, plaintiff correctly argues that the record establishes that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing so much of plaintiff’s complaint as sought to recover upon plaintiff’s claim seeking $54.73 for services rendered on February 5, 2014 and billed under CPT code 99203 for the evaluation and management of a new patient. Likewise, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing so much of plaintiff’s complaint as sought to recover an additional $.63 for services rendered on February 27, 2014 because, as set forth in the affidavit defendant submitted [*2]from its certified professional coder, plaintiff was entitled to $16.70 for that date of service but defendant only paid $16.07.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover $54.73 for an initial visit on February 5, 2014 and an additional $.63 for services rendered on February 27, 2014 are denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered March 9, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). By order entered March 9, 2015, the Civil Court denied the motion, but found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. The Civil Court further found that the only remaining issues for trial were the location of the office in which defendant generated the EUO scheduling letters, and the reasonableness of and justification for defendant’s EUO requests. Defendant appeals, contending that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

To establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a complaint on the ground that a provider had failed to appear for an EUO, an insurer must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had twice duly demanded an EUO from the provider, that the provider had twice failed to appear, and that the insurer had issued a timely denial of the claim (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014]; Maiga Prods. Corp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 59 Misc 3d 145[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50736[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). Plaintiff challenges the Civil Court’s implicit CPLR 3212 (g) findings in favor of defendant. However, a review of the record establishes that the Civil Court correctly determined that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling [*2]letters and the denial of claim forms, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. As a result, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We note that neither defendant’s transmittal of the claims from one of its offices to another of its offices nor the location of the office within which the timely EUO scheduling letters were generated raises a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered July 15, 2015. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion finding, among other things, the existence of an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff had contacted defendant to reschedule the EUOs and, if so, whether defendant had responded to plaintiff.

The affidavits submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim form had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). In addition, the affirmations submitted by defendant’s attorneys, who were present in their offices to conduct the EUO of plaintiff on the scheduled dates, were sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear on those dates. As a result, defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014]; Palafox PT, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 144[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51653[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

In opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff’s owner submitted an affidavit in which he stated that he had called defendant to reschedule each EUO and that he left messages for defendant’s investigator, but that plaintiff was not contacted by defendant in response to the messages. In response, defendant did not provide an affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge, but rather relied upon an affirmation from its counsel, asserting that [*2]plaintiff’s owner’s affidavit was too vague and that plaintiff was attempting to raise a feigned issue of fact. On this record, we find that defendant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

719878/2018

Appearances of Counsel:
Attorney for Petitioner
Amos Weinberg, Esq.
Somerset Drive South
Great Neck NY 11020-1821
(516) 829-3900

Attorney for Respondent
Adam Waknine, Esq.
Peter c. Merani, PC.
1001 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 1800
New York, N.Y. 10018
(212) 629-9690

The following papers numbered EF 1-22 read on this petition by B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C., seeking a declaratory judgment to turn over monies from its bank account maintained outside of New York State with Bank of America, N.A. in such sum as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and determining that the judgment has and continues to accrue interest pursuant to the Insurance Department Regulations in effect at the time of the subject accident involving plaintiff’s assignor, in accordance with prior case law, at the rate of 2% per month compounded and Respondent’s Cross-Petition, seeking dismissal of this action based upon the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and sanctions for the filing of an allegedly frivolous action.

Notice of Petition, Petition, Exhibits EF 1-9

Notice of Cross-Petition, Petition, Exhibits EF 10-21

Affirmations in Opposition, Exhibits EF 22

Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that this petition and cross-petition are determined as follows:

The instant action arises out of an action filed in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, entitled B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. a/a/o Tony Dance v. Allstate Insurance Company, Index No. 70935/00, which sought to recover first party No-Fault benefits for services rendered to defendant’s insured by plaintiff. Plaintiff was granted summary judgment in that action and on November 15, 2001, the Clerk of the Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $8,847.49. Plaintiff did not attempt to enforce said judgment until 2015, at which time defendant moved for a protective order and modification of the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5240. At that time, the amount of the judgment had grown to $227,060.57 ($8,847.49 plus 2% per month interest, compounded from November 15, 2001 through August 11, 2015). In an Order, dated November 16, 2015, the Civil Court found that plaintiff unreasonably allowed the compound interest to accrue and stayed said interest for the period of November 1, 2005 through June 19, 2015, the date that defendant received the plaintiff’s collections letter. Respondent issued checks in the amount of $22,999.70 in accordance with that decision and sought a satisfaction of judgment, moving by Order to Show Cause to compel same. Said motion was granted on July 7, 2016. Plaintiff appealed and on August 18, 2017, the Appellate Term, consolidated both appeals and reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that contrary to defendant’s assertions, plaintiff did not prevent defendant from timely paying the judgment. The Appellate Term added in an advisory capacity that the postjudgment rate of interest should be calculated pursuant to CPLR 5004 and not at the 2% per month rate provided for in 11 NYCRR 65-3.9(a). Thereafter, B.Z. Chiropractic moved before the Appellate Term seeking clarification of said decision or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Term clarified that it was the Court’s intention to note that interest be awarded at the rate of 9% per year as in CPLR 5004, but that same is advisory and not appealable as of right or by permission.

The portion of Petitioner’s Petition seeking to turn over monies from its bank account maintained outside of New York State with Bank of America, N.A. in such sum as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment is denied in its entirety as Bank of America, N.A. is not a party to this action as required by CPLR §5225(b).

The portion of Petitioner’s Petition seeking a declaratory judgment on the proper interest rate which accrues on first party no-fault benefits after the entry of judgment is decided as follows: Pursuant to CPLR §5004, interest shall be at the rate of nine per centum per annum, except where otherwise provided by statute. Pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.9(a), All overdue mandatory and additional personal injury protection benefits due an applicant or assignee shall bear interest at a rate of two percent per month, calculated on a pro-rata basis using a 30-day month. At the time that the underlying claims were filed, said interest accrued at a compound rate. It is well settled that “with respect to interest on first party benefits due under the no-fault statute,…the Insurance Law supersedes the provisions for interest contained in CPLR 5002, 5003 and 5004 (Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v. Lombino, 57 AD2d 957, 959, 394 N.Y.S.2d 898 [1977]) The policies of encouraging prompt payment of claims and reducing litigation outweigh limits on [*2]interest found elsewhere, See, Matter of McKenna v County of Nassau, Off. of County Attorney, 97 AD2d 440 (2d Dept 1983). The interest rate on No-Fault actions is intentionally punitive, with severe penalties in order to encourage prompt adjustment of claims. As such, the rate of interest is not reduced simply because the claim has been reduced to a judgment. While such claims remain overdue, they accrue interest at two percent per month. As such, plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment recognizing same.

Respondent’s cross-petition seeking dismissal and sanctions for the filing of a frivolous action is denied in its entirety for the reasons above.

Dated: 2/25/2019
_________________________
Laurence L. Love, J.S.C.

Decided on February 22, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on February 13, 2019

Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered December 17, 2014. The order denied defendant’s motion for leave to amend its answer, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), to add, among other things, the affirmative defense of res judicata, to deem the amended answer served nunc pro tunc and, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred based on that doctrine.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for leave to amend its answer, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), to add, among other things, the affirmative defense of res judicata, to deem the amended answer served nunc pro tunc and in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred based on that doctrine is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Civil Court in August 2011 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. On November 21, 2011, the insurer commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, and, approximately two weeks later, on December 8, 2011, served an answer in the Civil Court action. In a declaratory judgment entered May 7, 2013 upon the failure of plaintiff and its assignor to appear and answer the complaint, the Supreme Court declared, among other things, that the insurer is not required to pay no-fault benefits to the provider and its assignor on the ground that the alleged accident was a staged incident and, therefore, was not covered under the policy in question. Thereafter, the insurer moved in the Civil Court for leave to amend its answer to include, insofar as is relevant, the affirmative defense of res judicata, to deem the amended answer timely served nunc pro tunc, and, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action in the Civil Court is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff opposed the [*2]motion. By order dated December 17, 2014, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion, finding that defendant had waived its res judicata defense by submitting its answer in the Civil Court after it had commenced the declaratory judgment action.

Generally, leave to amend a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) should be granted where there is no significant prejudice or surprise to the opposing party and where the proof submitted in support of the motion indicates that the amendment may have merit (see Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959 [1983]; Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806, 808 [2007]). In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice (see Barrett v Kasco Constr. Co., 84 AD2d 555, 556 [1981], affd 56 NY2d 830 [1982]) or surprise (see CPLR 3018 [b]; Rogoff v San Juan Racing Assn., 77 AD2d 831, 832 [1980], affd 54 NY2d 883 [1981]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]) as a result of the proposed amendment to the answer, while defendant established that the proposed affirmative defense had merit. Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court that defendant had waived its defense of res judicata, defendant had no basis to assert that defense before May 7, 2013, when the declaratory judgment was entered in the Supreme Court (see Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 52 Misc 3d 138[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Renelique, 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U]). Consequently, the Civil Court should have granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking leave to amend the answer to include the res judicata defense and to deem the answer timely served nunc pro tunc.

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final adjudication of a claim on the merits precludes relitigation of that claim and all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions by a party or those in privity with a party” (Ciraldo v JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 140 AD3d 912, 913-914 [2016]; see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]). It is well settled that default judgments which have not been vacated can have res judicata effect (see Lazides v P & G Enters., 58 AD3d 607 [2009]; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Williams, 29 AD3d 688, 690 [2006]; Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Facey, 272 AD2d 399 [2000]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). In light of the Supreme Court declaratory judgment, we reverse the order and grant the branch of defendant’s motion seeking, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint as barred (see Active Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins., 58 Misc 3d 156[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50201[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 52 Misc 3d 138[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; J.K.M. Med. Care, P.C. v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51071[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Renelique, 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in the present action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the judgment in the declaratory judgment action (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp., 250 NY 304; Flushing Traditional Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 133[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50052[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C., 38 Misc 3d 1).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for leave to amend its answer pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) to add, among other things, the affirmative defense of res judicata, to deem the proposed amended answer timely served nunc pro tunc and, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred is granted.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered March 9, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). In an order entered March 9, 2016, the Civil Court denied the motion, but found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. The Civil Court further found that the only remaining issues for trial were the location of the generation of defendant’s EUO letters and matters relating to the reasonableness of its EUO requests. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

To establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a complaint on the ground that a provider had failed to appear for an EUO, an insurer must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had twice duly demanded an EUO from the provider, that the provider had twice failed to appear, and that the insurer had issued a timely denial of the claims (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014]; Integrative Pain Medicine, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 53 Misc 3d 140[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51520[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016])—all elements that the Civil Court found to have been established pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g).

Plaintiff does not argue that defendant did not demonstrate its prima facie case. Rather, plaintiff argues that defendant’s EUO requests were unreasonable, in that defendant did not [*2]respond to plaintiff’s letter demanding that defendant provide its good faith reasons for requesting plaintiff’s EUO. However, as plaintiff failed to submit proof that it had mailed such a letter, its argument lacks any basis (see e.g. Professional Health Imaging, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 132[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50997[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). In any event, defendant would not have been required to provide the reason for its demand in response to an objection from plaintiff (see Flow Chiropractic, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co.,44 Misc 3d 132[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51142[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]).

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.