July 22, 2009

Richard Denise, M.D., P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (2009 NY Slip Op 29313)

Headnote

A provider sued the New York City Transit Authority for no-fault benefits and the Civil Court dismissed the complaint as time-barred. The Transit Authority conceded that as a self-insurer it is subject to the No-Fault Law like an insurer, and that no-fault actions are generally subject to a six-year limitations period. It argued that claims against a self-insurer must be brought within three years because its liability is derived strictly from statute. The Appellate Term, First Department, rejected this, reasoning that the self-insurer's obligation is mandatory and not decreased by self-insurance and that such claims remain contractual in nature like uninsured motorist claims. The order was reversed, the motion denied and the complaint reinstated.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Richard Denise, M.D., P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (2009 NY Slip Op 29313)

Richard Denise, M.D., P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth.

2009 NY Slip Op 29313 [25 Misc 3d 13]

Accepted for Miscellaneous Reports Publication

AT1

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, October 14, 2009

[*1]

Richard Denise, M.D., P.C., as Assignee of Irene Trapp, Appellant,
v
New York City Transit Authority, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, July 22, 2009

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Israel, Israel & Purdy, LLP, Great Neck (Jennifer Greenhalgh Howard of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Jones Jones O’Connell LLP, Brooklyn (Agnes Neiger of counsel), for respondent.

{**25 Misc 3d at 11} OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order, dated May 7, 2007, reversed, without costs, motion denied and complaint reinstated.

Defendant New York City Transit Authority concedes that as a self-insurer, it is subject to the provisions of the No-Fault Law to the same extent as an insurer (see Insurance Law § 5103 [a]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 321 [2]; Public Authorities Law § 1215; Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219 [1986]), and that actions to recover no-fault benefits are generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v Glenwood Med., P.C., 48 AD3d 319 [2008]). It argues, however, that while an injured claimant has six years to assert a no-fault claim against an insured owner, a claimant must assert an identical claim against a self-insurer within three years, since the liability of a self-insurer for the payment of no-fault benefits is derived strictly from statute. We disagree.

Defendant’s responsibility to provide no-fault coverage is mandatory and the obligation is not decreased merely because defendant is self-insured (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw, 52 NY2d 818, 820 [1980]). As in the case of an uninsured motorist claim (see Matter of ELRAC, Inc. v Suero, 38 AD3d 544 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 811 [2007]), the right to obtain no-fault coverage, from an injured claimant’s perspective, “is no less than the corresponding right under a policy issued by an insurer” (id. at 545 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Spring World Acupuncture, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 24 Misc 3d 39 [2009]). The Suero court held that although a claim for uninsured motorist benefits against a self-insurer is statutorily mandated, such a claim remains contractual in nature and thus, is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. Since we find no basis in law or compelling reasons of policy to distinguish between the right to uninsured motorist benefits and the right to no-fault benefits, we hold that a claim for no-fault benefits against a self-insurer, such as defendant here, is governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

McKeon, P.J., and Heitler, J., concur.