Rubin, Fiorella & Friedman, LLP (Harlan R. Schreiber, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Ilona Finkelshteyn, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered April 8, 2016. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action is granted; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Defendant correctly argues on appeal that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment, as plaintiff failed to establish that its claims had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Defendant acknowledged that it had received the claim underlying plaintiff’s first cause of action on July 9, 2014 and the claim underlying plaintiff’s second cause of action on August 6, 2014, and established the mailing of independent medical examination (IME) scheduling letters to the assignor (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), which scheduled plaintiff’s assignor’s IME for August 29, 2014. Thus, contrary to defendant’s further argument, defendant did not demonstrate that it was entitled to summary [*2]judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first cause of action because the IME had not been scheduled to be held within 30 calendar days after defendant had received the claim underlying the first cause of action (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [d]).

With respect to the second cause of action, however, the IME was scheduled to be timely held. In addition to establishing that the IME scheduling letters had been mailed to the assignor, defendant established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]) and that defendant had timely denied the claim underlying the second cause of action on that ground. Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722), and as plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action should have been granted.

Defendant’s remaining contentions lack merit.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action is granted.

WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 9, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, DAVID ELLIOT, JJ
2016-1299 K C

Abrams, Cohen & Associates, P.C. (Frank Piccininni), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov and Adam Waknine), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Theresa M. Ciccotto, J.), entered March 16, 2016. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s answer is deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 1, 2013 to recover assigned, first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant served an answer in or about September 2013. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), contending that plaintiff’s action was barred by virtue of an order entered on March 14, 2014 in a Supreme Court declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court order, entered on default, declared that defendant herein was not obligated to provide coverage for no-fault claims arising out of the accident in question, and that plaintiff herein and its assignor were not entitled to reimbursement for services rendered to the assignor with respect to that accident. Plaintiff did not oppose defendant’s cross motion in the Civil Court. Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion, [*2]finding that defendant had failed to raise the defense of res judicata in its answer.

For the reasons stated in Active Chiropractic, P.C., as Assignee of Mary Parrish v Allstate Ins. (— Misc 3d &mdash, 2018 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2016-1297 K C], decided herewith), the order is reversed, defendant’s answer is deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 9, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, DAVID ELLIOT, JJ
2016-1298 K C

Abrams, Cohen & Associates, P.C. (Frank Piccininni), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov and Adam Waknine), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Theresa M. Ciccotto, J.), entered March 16, 2016. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s answer is deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 8, 2013 to recover assigned, first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant served an answer on March 19, 2013. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), contending that plaintiff’s action was barred by virtue of an order entered on March 14, 2014 in a Supreme Court declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court order, entered on default, declared that defendant herein was not obligated to provide coverage for no-fault claims arising out of the accident in question, and that plaintiff herein and its assignor were not entitled to reimbursement for services rendered to the assignor with respect to that accident. Plaintiff did not oppose defendant’s cross motion in the Civil Court. Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion, finding that [*2]defendant had failed to raise the defense of res judicata in its answer.

For the reasons stated in Active Chiropractic, P.C., as Assignee of Mary Parrish v Allstate Ins. (— Misc 3d &mdash, 2018 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2016-1297 K C], decided herewith), the order is reversed, defendant’s answer is deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 9, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, DAVID ELLIOT, JJ
2016-1297 K C

Abrams, Cohen & Associates, P.C. (Frank Piccininni), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov and Adam Waknine), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Theresa M. Ciccotto, J.), entered March 16, 2016. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s answer is deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 8, 2013 to recover assigned, first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant served an answer on March 5, 2013. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), contending that plaintiff’s action was barred by virtue of an order entered on May 13, 2014 in a Supreme Court declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court order, entered on default, declared that defendant herein was not obligated to provide coverage for no-fault claims arising out of the accident in question, and that plaintiff herein and its assignor were not entitled to reimbursement for services rendered to the assignor with respect to that accident. Plaintiff did not oppose defendant’s cross motion in the Civil Court. Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion, finding that [*2]defendant had failed to raise the defense of res judicata in its answer.

Initially, we note that, although defendant’s motion was denominated as one to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), the motion was made after issue had been joined (see generally CPLR 3211 [e]). “Whether or not issue has been joined, the court, after adequate notice to the parties, may treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment” (CPLR 3211 [c]). While the Civil Court never notified the parties that it was treating the motion as one for summary judgment, an exception to the notice requirement is applicable, as defendant’s motion exclusively involved “a purely legal question rather than any issues of fact” (Mihlovan v Grozavu, 72 NY2d 506, 508 [1988]; Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 AD2d 310, 320 [1987]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50095[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). Consequently, it was proper for the Civil Court, in effect, to treat defendant’s motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment “without first giving notice of its intention to do so” (Four Seasons Hotels, 127 AD2d at 320).

We note that, while defendant failed to raise the affirmative defense of res judicata in its answer, defendant had no basis to assert that defense before May 13, 2014, when the order in the Supreme Court declaratory judgment action was entered (see Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 52 Misc 3d 138[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). While the better practice would have been for defendant to move to amend its answer after May 13, 2014, nevertheless, defendant’s answer may be deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata (see Barrett v Kasco Constr. Co., 84 AD2d 555 [1981], affd 56 NY2d 830 [1982]). We note that “an unpleaded defense may serve as the basis for granting summary judgment in the absence of surprise or prejudice to the opposing party” (Sullivan v American Airlines, Inc., 80 AD3d 600, 602 [2011]; see Renelique, 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U]).

In light of the Supreme Court’s order in the declaratory judgment action, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s cross motion (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the order in the declaratory judgment action (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Neiberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]; Flushing Traditional Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 133[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50052[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C., 38 Misc 3d at 2).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant’s answer is deemed amended to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 9, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, DAVID ELLIOT, JJ
2016-912 K C

Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Elke E. Mirabella and Joelle Roberts), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov and Adam Waknine), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered November 18, 2015. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Prior to the commencement of this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, New York County, against, among others, plaintiff herein and its assignor. Thereafter, defendant, asserting that plaintiff and the assignor had failed to answer the complaint, moved in the Supreme Court for, among other things, the entry of a default judgment. By order dated December 8, 2014, the Supreme Court stated that an unrelated branch of defendant’s motion was denied and that the “remainder of the motion [wa]s granted without opposition.” After the instant action was commenced in the Civil Court, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Relying on the Supreme Court’s order, defendant cross-moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Defendant appeals from the order of the Civil Court entered November 18, 2015 which granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion.

Inasmuch as defendant raises no issue on appeal with respect to plaintiff’s establishment [*2]of its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, we do not pass upon the propriety of the Civil Court’s determination with respect thereto.

With respect to defendant’s cross motion, as the December 8, 2014 Supreme Court order in the declaratory judgment action merely granted the branch of defendant’s motion for the entry of a default judgment against plaintiff and its assignor, but failed to make a statement declaring the rights of the parties involved (see Hirsch v Lindor Realty Corp., 63 NY2d 878, 881 [1984]; Suburban Bindery Equip. Corp. v Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 150 AD2d 767 [1989]; Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 48 Misc 3d 85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]), the Supreme Court order cannot be considered a conclusive final determination and, thus, can have no preclusive effect in the action at bar (see Promed Orthocare Supply, Inc. v AIG Advantage Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 128[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51886[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; cf. Vital Meridian Acupuncture, P.C. v Republic W. Ins. Co., 46 Misc 3d 147[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50222[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 8, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : JERRY GARGUILO, J.P., ANTHONY MARANO, TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, JJ
2016-1038 S C

The Law Office of Gregory A. Goodman, P.C., (Gregory A. Goodman), for appellant. Law Offices of Daniel J. Tucker, (Daniel J. Tucker, Joshua Goldberg and Netanel BenChaim of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fourth District (James F. Matthews, J.), dated April 19, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer or compel defendant to produce its no-fault examiner for a deposition.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for $1,310.94 is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the District Court as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer or compel defendant to produce its no-fault examiner for a deposition.

In support of its motion, defendant established that it had timely mailed letters scheduling an initial and follow-up independent medical examination (IME) (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of [*2]Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs on January 9, 2014 and February 6, 2014 (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Plaintiff’s claim for $1,019.62 was received on March 17, 2014 and timely denied, based on the assignor’s failure to appear for IMEs, on April 3, 2014 (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123); therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish a basis to disturb the portion of the order which granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon that claim.

While defendant did not deny plaintiff’s $1,310.94 claim, which it had received on January 7, 2014, within 30 days of receipt of that claim or of the second IME nonappearance, defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that, upon receipt of that claim, it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for written verification (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; 65-3.8 [l]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123) and that it had timely denied the claim, based on the assignor’s failure to appear for IMEs, within 30 days of receiving the requested verification (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [l]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Alev Med. Supply, Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 143[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50258[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). However, as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact regarding defendant’s mailing of its initial and follow-up requests for written verification, there is an issue of fact as to whether defendant’s time to pay or deny that claim was tolled by virtue of the pending verification requests and, thus, whether defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s $1,310.94 claim was timely. In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s contention that the branch of its cross motion seeking summary judgment should have been granted lacks merit.

To the extent plaintiff asserts that the District Court should have granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking to strike defendant’s answer or, in the alternative, compel defendant to produce its no-fault examiner for a deposition, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it had requested a deposition in this action, as the affidavit of service for the deposition notice annexed to plaintiff’s cross motion is for a different case. Consequently, these branches of plaintiff’s cross motion were properly denied.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the $1,310.94 claim is denied.

GARGUILO, J.P., MARANO and RUDERMAN, JJ., concur.

Decided on February 2, 2018

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on February 2, 2018

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on February 2, 2018

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP (Jean H. Kang, Esq.), for appellant. Korsunskiy Legal Group, P.C. (Henry Guindi, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered May 21, 2015. The judgment, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff no-fault statutory prejudgment interest from January 8, 2007.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits on January 8, 2007. After a nonjury trial held on November 3, 2014, the Civil Court found in favor of plaintiff and awarded it the principal sum of $1,131.68. Defendant made an oral application to the court to toll the accrual of no-fault statutory prejudgement interest based upon plaintiff’s delay in the prosecution of the action. In the alternative, defendant sought to submit a posttrial brief on the tolling issue. The Civil Court denied defendant’s requests, and a judgment was entered on May 21, 2015 awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $1,131.68 and, among other things, no-fault statutory prejudgment interest from January 8, 2007. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of the judgment as awarded plaintiff no-fault statutory prejudgment interest from January 8, 2007.

No-fault statutory prejudgment interest (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]) begins to accrue when the action is commenced (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [c]), “unless the applicant unreasonably delays the . . . court proceeding” (11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [d]). While a significant amount of time elapsed between the commencement of this action and the trial, defendant did not adequately demonstrate to the Civil Court, and there was nothing in the record to indicate, the reason for the protracted delay or that it was plaintiff which had “unreasonably delay[ed]” the action (cf. Kew Gardens Med & Rehab, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 143[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51240[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; V.S. Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51760[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, [*2]11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; Aminov v Country Wide Ins. Co., 43 Misc 3d 87 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

Accordingly, as there was no basis for the Civil Court to toll the accrual of no-fault statutory prejudgment interest, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.