Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-232 K C

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Joseph Padrucco, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Leslie A. Eyma, Jr., Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered October 27, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the denial of claim form had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) and to demonstrate that it had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive for the services at issue.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-228 K C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Stern & Montana, LLP (Richard Montana, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered November 21, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon plaintiff’s failure to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath.

Plaintiff correctly argues on appeal that the affidavits submitted by defendant did not sufficiently set forth a standard office practice or procedure that would ensure that the denial of claim form had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Thus, defendant did not demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2011-192 K C

Thomas Torto, Esq., for appellant. Zara Javakov, Esq., for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered September 15, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant’s cross motion was based upon its assertions that it had properly reimbursed plaintiff for some of the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule and that it had timely denied reimbursement for the remaining services at issue due to a lack of medical necessity.

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the Civil Court’s determination that, as to the claims that were denied based upon a lack of medical necessity, there is a triable issue of fact regarding medical necessity (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). As to the claims that were denied on the ground that they had been properly paid pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule, defendant failed to establish that defense as a matter of law (see Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App [*2]Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2015-231 K C

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered October 2, 2014. The order granted plaintiff’s motion to enter a default judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept a late answer.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion to enter a default judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept a late answer is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order which granted plaintiff’s motion to enter a default judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept a late answer.

It is well settled that in order to open a default in answering, the defendant must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing and answering the complaint as well as a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 31 AD3d 743 [2006]). Here, defendant established a reasonable excuse for its failure to serve an answer (see Vardaros v Zapas, 105 AD3d 1037 [2013]) and made a prima facie showing of a viable defense based on a lack of medical necessity.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion to enter a default judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept a late answer is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2014-2749 Q C

Gullo & Associates, LLP (Cristina Carollo, Esq.), for appellant. Baker Sanders, LLC, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered October 7, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion but made, in effect, CPLR 3212 (g) findings that defendant’s denial of claim form had been timely and proper and that the sole issue for trial was whether plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affirmation from the doctor who was to perform the IMEs, which affirmation was sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In view of the foregoing, and as plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the [*2]complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2014-2515 Q C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Aloy O. Ibuzor (Shana A. Kleinman, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Sally E. Unger, J.), entered September 9, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through seventh causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through seventh causes of action on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath.

For the reasons stated in Greenway Med. Supply Corp., as Assignee of Tellechea Maria v Travelers Ins. Co. (__ Misc 3d ___, 2017 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2014-2253 Q C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2014-2389 Q C

Law Offices of Printz & Goldstein (Lawrence J. Chanice, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Ilona Finkelshteyn, P.C. (Emilia I. Rutigliano, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered March 20, 2013. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $878.67 on its first cause of action.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, and the matter is remitted for a new trial on the first cause of action.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services it had provided to its assignor, a nonjury trial was held on the first cause of action, limited to defendant’s defense of lack of medical necessity (see CPLR 3212 [g]). Prior to defendant calling any witnesses, the Civil Court indicated that, as defendant would not be able to admit into evidence the peer review report upon which the denial of claim had been based “for the truth of what is in there,” defendant would not be able to meet its “burden.”^[FN1] The court disagreed with [*2]defendant’s position that a “substitute doctor” could testify without the peer review report being admitted into evidence and directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff. A judgment was subsequently entered awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $878.67 on its first cause of action.

Contrary to the apparent holding of the Civil Court, an insurer cannot use a peer review report at trial for its “truth,” i.e., to prove the insurer’s defense of lack of medical necessity (see Alev Med. Supply, Inc. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 128[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; A-Quality Med. Supply v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 24, 26 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Indeed, the “admission of a peer review report into evidence as part of a defendant’s proof of lack of medical necessity may constitute impermissible bolstering of its expert’s testimony” (A-Quality Med. Supply, 39 Misc 3d at 26). While an insurer’s expert witness’s testimony should be limited to the basis for the denial as set forth in the peer review report (see e.g. Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v Progressive Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 154[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50349[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]), “it is plaintiff’s burden to make an appropriate objection in the event the testimony goes beyond the basis for the denial and, if necessary, produce the peer review report” (Promed Orthocare Supply, Inc. v Geico Ins. Co., ____ Misc 3d _____, 2017 NY Slip Op 51264[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). Consequently, a new trial is required on the first cause of action.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new trial on the first cause of action.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Footnote 1: In a no-fault trial dealing with a defense of lack of medical necessity, an insurer has an initial burden to rebut the presumption of medical necessity which attaches to a claim form; however, it is the plaintiff who has the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the services at issue were medically necessary (see Dayan v Allstate Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 151[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51751[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co., 37 Misc 3d 19 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2014-2258 Q C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Aloy O. Ibuzor (Miriam Granov, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Sally E. Unger, J.), entered August 13, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath.

For the reasons stated in Greenway Med. Supply Corp., as Assignee of Tellechea Maria v Travelers Ins. Co. (__ Misc 3d ___, 2017 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2014-2253 Q C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2014-2253 Q C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Offices of Aloy O. Ibuzor (Miriam Granov, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Sally E. Unger, J.), entered August 13, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, the affidavits submitted by defendant established that the denial of claim form had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Plaintiff’s remaining contention lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 15, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, MARTIN M. SOLOMON, JJ
2014-2167 K C

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carol Ruth Feinman, J.), entered July 10, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). While plaintiff’s owner asserts that, upon receiving the EUO scheduling letters, he called defendant’s investigator and left a message asking to reschedule the EUOs, plaintiff nevertheless failed to raise a triable issue of fact, since the person plaintiff’s owner allegedly called was not the investigator identified in defendant’s EUO scheduling letter as the person to be called in case of any issue, and the phone number allegedly called was not the same as the phone number set forth in defendant’s EUO scheduling letter.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.